5 ADLER 551-607 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/28/2015 2:55 PM

EQUITY BY THE NUMBERS: MEASURING POVERTY,
INEQUALITY, AND INJUSTICE
Matthew D. Adler*
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 551
I. EQUITY METRICS: AN OVERVIEW .......................................................... 559
A. Inequality Metrics .................................................................... 560
B. Social Welfare Functions......................................................... 566
C. Poverty Metrics ....................................................................... 569
D. Social-Gradient Metrics .......................................................... 573
E. A Summary............................................................................... 576
II.WHY THE PIGOU-DALTON PRINCIPLE? A GENERIC JUSTIFICATION ...... 579
III.WHAT IS THE BEST CURRENCY FOR THE PIGOU-DALTON
PRINCIPLE?...................................................................................... 583
IV.SHOULD THE PIGOU-DALTON PRINCIPLE BE “RESTRICTED”?
HEREIN OF POVERTY AND SOCIAL-GRADIENT METRICS................ 592
A. Poverty Metrics ....................................................................... 593
B. Social-Gradient Metrics .......................................................... 596
V.EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY METRICS .................................................. 599
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 606
INTRODUCTION
Can we measure inequity? A naïve response denies the possibility of
quantification. And yet scholarly and popular discourse abounds with
numbers purporting to measure inequality, poverty, and other aspects of
equity. A more sophisticated answer acknowledges the wide use of equity
metrics, but stresses their plurality. “How to quantify unfairness is a value
choice. Different numbers mirror different ‘takes’ on the meaning of
equity. End of story.”
A yet more nuanced response sees structure in the plurality of equity
metrics. There are deep, unifying axioms, but divergence with respect to
the application and specification of those axioms. Seeing both the deep
consensus, and the differences in specification, helps us think clearly about
the normative position presupposed by the use of one or another metric.
That, at least, is the story I will tell here.
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Has the United States become a less equitable society over the last
thirty-five years, since the 1970s? Answers to that highly salient question
illustrate the plurality of tools for quantifying equity. A classic inequality
metric (such as the Gini coefficient, or the variance-based “coefficient of
variation”) quantifies the population-wide distribution of some attribute.1
But which attribute? The inequality of periodic income (in particular,
annual income) has increased since the 1970s. This is true for different
definitions of “income.” It is also robust to the choice of inequality metric,
although metrics that are especially sensitive to what happens at the top of
the income distribution will record a more dramatic change over the last
thirty-five years.2
Wage and wealth inequality have also increased.3 But if we move from
income, wages, and wealth, to a different indicator of economic well-

*
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1.
See infra Section I.A (describing structure of inequality metrics).
2.
Two detailed studies of U.S. income inequality over the last several decades are REBECCA M.
BLANK, CHANGING INEQUALITY (2011); Jonathan Heathcote et al., Unequal We Stand: An Empirical
Analysis of Economic Inequality in the United States, 1967–2006, 13 REV. OF ECON. DYNAMICS 15
(2010). Heathcote et al. look at a variety of definitions of income (including wage earnings, pre-tax
income, and disposable income) and a variety of inequality metrics (including the Gini coefficient,
variance of logarithm, and percentile ratios). They generally find increasing inequality since the 1970s
(indeed, since the beginning of their time series, in 1967) as illustrated by their figures 8, 9, 11, and 12.
Blank examines inequality over the period 1979–2007, looking specifically at earnings and “total
income” (the sum of earnings, government income, and unearned income from other sources), and
using the Gini, coefficient of variation, and percentile ratios as her inequality metrics. When she looks
at all adults 18–64 (including nonworking household members allocated a share of household income),
she finds an increase in all inequality metrics applied to both total annual income and annual earnings.
See BLANK, supra, at 64–65 tbl.5; cf. id. 30–31 tbl.2 (finding more mixed picture with respect to
earnings of all workers). See also Jeffrey Thompson & Timothy M. Smeeding, Country Case Study—
USA, in THE GREAT RECESSION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME 202 (Stephen P.
Jenkins et al. eds., 2013) (measuring income inequality with Gini coefficient and percentile ratios, as
well as top percentile shares, and finding increasing inequality from 1979 through first years of Great
Recession).
These findings of increasing U.S. income inequality are confirmed in a recent detailed
comparative analysis that includes U.S. time trends. See Andrea Brandolini & Timothy M. Smeeding,
Income Inequality in Richer and OECD Countries, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY 71, 83 fig.4.2, 88 fig.4.5 (Wiemer Salverda et al. eds., 2009). Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez,
using measures of inequality focused on the disparity between top incomes and the rest of the
population (in particular, top percentile shares), find a very dramatic increase in U.S. income inequality
from the 1970s through 2007. See Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Top
Incomes in the Long Run of History, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 3 figs.1, 2 & 3 (2011). Piketty, in his influential
recent book, extends the timeline through the Great Recession; a dramatic increase in top percentile
income shares from the 1970s through 2010 can be observed in figures 8.5 through 8.8. See THOMAS
PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 291–300 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014). The
figures in Thompson and Smeeding, supra, at 216–217, tell the same story.
3.
On wage inequality, see BLANK, supra note 2, at 30–31 tbl.2; Heathcote, supra note 2, at 23
fig.4. On wealth inequality, see Fabian T. Pfeffer, Sheldon Danziger & Robert Schoeni, Wealth
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being—“consumption,” i.e., individual expenditure on goods and
services—the picture is more muddled. A number of studies find that
inequality in the population-wide distribution of consumption in the United
States has increased much less, since the 1970s, than inequality in the
distribution of income4—although these findings have been contested.5
Consumption tends to be more stable than income, since individuals can
borrow and save to “smooth out” transitory changes to income. Relatedly,
an individual’s lifetime income is arguably better proxied by her periodic
(e.g., annual) consumption than by her periodic income. Thus, it may be the
case that lifetime income inequality increased substantially less during the
period 1980–present, as compared to annual income inequality.6
What about the poor? Has the degree of poverty gone up or down?
Poverty metrics, unlike inequality metrics, are “truncated” at the poverty
line: they ignore the distribution of the relevant attribute above that line.7
Traditionally, scholarly discussion of poverty—and certainly official
poverty measurement by the U.S. government—has focused on income as
the relevant attribute, with the poverty line set either by identifying the
income required to meet certain needs (for example, nutritional needs), or
as some fraction of population mean or median income. The headcount
ratio (the fraction of the population with incomes below the poverty line) is
the simplest measure of the degree of income poverty.8 The headcount
ratio, combined with the official U.S. definition of “income” and official
poverty line, yields an oscillating pattern: from 13% (1980), to 13.5%
(1990), to 11.3% (2000), to 15.1% (2010).9 Using some alternative
definitions of “income,” Meyer and Sullivan find an oscillating pattern that

Disparities Before and After the Great Recession, 650 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 98 (2013);
Heathcote, supra note 2, at 42 fig.19.
4.
See ORAZIO P. ATTANASIO, ERICH BATTISTIN & MARIO PADULA, INEQUALITY IN LIVING
STANDARDS SINCE 1980 (2011); Richard Blundell et al., Consumption Inequality and Partial Insurance,
98 AM. ECON. REV. 1887 (2008); David S. Johnson et al., Economic Inequality Through the Prisms of
Income and Consumption, 128 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 11 (2005); Dirk Krueger & Fabrizio Perri, Does
Income Inequality Lead to Consumption Inequality? Evidence and Theory, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 163
(2006); Heathcote, supra note 2; Bruce D. Meyer & James X. Sullivan, Consumption and Income
Inequality
in
the
U.S.
Since
the
1960s
(Apr.
2,
2013)
(working
paper)
(http://www3.nd.edu/~jsulliv4/Inequality3.6.pdf).
5.
See Mark A. Aguiar & Mark Bils, Has Consumption Inequality Mirrored Income Inequality?
(Dec.
23,
2013)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/mirror_0.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2014); Orazio
Attanasio et al., The Evolution of Income, Consumption, and Leisure Inequality in the U.S., 1980–2010
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17982, 2012).
6.
Cf. Jeremy Arkes, Trends in Long-Run Versus Cross-Section Earnings Inequality in the 1970s
and 1980s, 44 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 199 (1998) (finding Gini coefficient of five-year earnings to be
lower than average Gini coefficient of annual earnings during the 1970s and 1980s).
7.
See infra Section I.C (describing structure of poverty metrics).
8.
Buhong Zheng, Aggregate Poverty Measures, 11 J. ECON. SURV. 123, 124 (1997).
9.
See Bruce D. Meyer & James X. Sullivan, Winning the War: Poverty from the Great Society to
the Great Recession, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 133, 150–51 tbl.1 (2012).
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yields a net decrease in the headcount ratio from 1980 to 2010; and,
switching to consumption poverty, a larger decrease.10
To be sure, it is deeply troubling (as a moral matter) and puzzling (as a
matter of social science) that poverty in the United States has not decreased
very substantially over the last thirty-five years, despite dramatic gains in
GDP per capita.11 The point here is that poverty metrics are insensitive to
distributional patterns above the poverty line. Thus, income inequality
metrics, which are sensitive to such patterns, see a time trend of increasing
inequity, while poverty metrics see a flat or perhaps somewhat downward
trend.
The picture becomes yet more muddled if we move away from
indicators of economic well-being: income, wealth, consumption, wages.
One such indicator is longevity. Peltzman examined the population
distribution of lifespan in the United States, starting in the 1740s through
2002. Using the Gini coefficient to measure the inequality of lifespan, he
found a dramatic decrease—with continuing declines in lifespan inequality
through the 1980s and 1990s.12
The cumulative reduction of mortality inequality is startling. In the
first century of our data, mortality Ginis range around 40 to 50.
That is, they exceed the upper range of household income Ginis
that prevail today in the developed world. The decline in mortality
inequality since the mid nineteenth century is hardly interrupted by
either of the two world wars . . . . This decline has taken the
mortality Ginis of today down to levels that are much lower than—
on the order of half—the lowest contemporary income Ginis in
these countries.13
Edwards and Tuljapurkar reach broadly similar conclusions, using a
variance-based measure of lifespan inequality.14
A different indicator of individual well-being is happiness, as
determined by surveys asking individuals, “How happy are you on a scale
of 1 to 5?” or some similar question. Looking at the variance in the
population-wide distribution of answers to these happiness surveys,
Stevenson and Wolfers find that “happiness inequality fell sharply during
10.
Id. For earlier studies—using alternative measures and finding oscillating poverty over the
decades after 1980—see KEVIN LANG, POVERTY AND DISCRIMINATION 87 fig.4.5 (2007); Thesia I.
Garner & Kathleen S. Short, Identifying the Poor: Poverty Measurement for the U.S. from 1996 to
2005, 56 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 237, 252 fig.2 (2010).
11.
See LANG, supra note 10, at 89 fig.4.6.
12.
Sam Peltzman, Mortality Inequality, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 175 (2009).
13.
Id. at 181.
14.
See Ryan D. Edwards & Shripad Tuljapurkar, Inequality in Life Spans and a New Perspective
on Mortality Convergence Across Industrialized Countries, 31 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 645 (2005).
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the 1970s and continued to fall in the 1980s, before rising slightly in the
1990s and 2000s.”15
While inequality metrics look at the population-wide distribution of
some attribute (income, wealth, happiness, longevity, wages, etc.), and
poverty metrics focus on the poverty-line-truncated distribution, yet a
third—quite prevalent—approach examines disparities between socially
salient groups.16 Call this the “social gradient” approach. Much work in this
vein, particularly in the United States, looks at racial disparities. How
serious are racial skews in income, wealth, longevity, educational
attainment, etc.? A different strand in social-gradient work looks at
socioeconomic differences, in particular at the correlation between
socioeconomic status and some non-economic indicator (often, health).17
Thus, the question, “Has the United States become a less equitable
society?” can be construed in social-gradient terms—more specifically, in
racial-disparity terms. Have racial disparities in economic or non-economic
indicators increased or decreased since the 1970s? The answer to that
question is complex. A recent study of racial disparities in health looked at
black–white differentials with respect to 15 health measures over the period
1990 to 2005, finding that disparities narrowed for 7 of the 15, and
increased for 5.18 As for income, it is unclear whether the decline in racial
disparities in income that occurred prior to 198019 has continued since then.
Black–white wage differentials seem to have increased over the period

15.
Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Happiness Inequality in the United States, 37(2) J.
LEGAL STUD. S33, S51 (2008). See also Andrew E. Clark et al., The Great Happiness Moderation 37
tbl.4.D (IZA Discussion Paper No. 6761) (2012). Dutta and Foster, using ordinal inequality indices,
reach the following conclusion: “In terms of broad trends, happiness inequality [in the U.S.] decreased
from its highest level in the 1970s, through the 1980s and 1990s. Only in the 2000s did it start to rise
again. However, in 2010 there has been a remarkable decline in inequality . . . .” Indranil Dutta &
James Foster, Inequality of Happiness in the U.S.: 1972–2010, 59 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 393, 413
(2013).
16.
See infra Section I.D.
17.
See generally C.J.L. Murray et al., Health Inequalities and Social Group Differences: What
Should We Measure?, 77 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 537, 538 (1999).
18.
Jennifer M. Orsi et al., Black–White Health Disparities in the United States and Chicago: A
15-Year Progress Analysis, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 349, 351–352 (2010). More precisely, statistically
significant improvements were observed with respect to 7 measures (all-cause mortality, cancer
mortality, lung cancer mortality, motor vehicle crash mortality, percentage low birth weight babies,
percentage no prenatal cancer in the first trimester, and primary and secondary syphilis case rate); and
statistically significant widenings were observed with respect to 5 (heart disease mortality, female
breast cancer mortality, diabetes mortality, suicide mortality, and tuberculosis case rate).
Using data on self-rated health from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Rohde and Guest find a
reduction in black–white health inequality from 1990 through 2007. Nicholas Rohde & Ross Guest,
Multidimensional Racial Inequality in the United States, 114 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 591, 597–599
(2013).
19.
See T. Kirk White, Initial Conditions at Emancipation: The Long-Run Effect on Black–White
Wealth and Earnings Inequality, 31 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 3370 (2007).
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1980 to 2007.20 Finally, Stevenson and Wolfers observe a large decrease in
the black–white disparity in happiness.21
In short, different generic approaches to measuring equity, and
different choices of the relevant attribute (income, health, happiness, etc.),
can yield strikingly different stories about the direction and magnitude of
the change in inequity in the United States over the last thirty-five years.
And the same would be true if we shifted our focus to global inequity,22 or
to a different time period.23
This observation—I should stress—is not meant to downgrade the
significance of the increase in U.S. income inequality. A high level of
income inequality distorts the democratic process,24 and may well cause
other sorts of inequities.25 Every citizen should be deeply concerned that
the top 10% of the income distribution captures almost one half of the total,
and that the top 1% captures one-fifth—returning us to disparities not seen
in the United States since the 1920s.26 Income inequality is not merely
intrinsically relevant—as one way of capturing inequity—but has a wide
range of causal impacts. The focus of this Article is the measurement of
inequity, not the (much larger) question of assessing the causal impacts of
income inequality or other kinds of inequities. The reader should certainly
be alive to that question, even though it is not one that I will be addressing
here.
In any event, what I have illustrated to this point—using a mini-casestudy of time trends in the United States over the last thirty-five years—is
that equity can be quantified (e.g., via inequality, poverty, or socialgradient metrics), but that the choice of metric can greatly affect the
analyst’s conclusions (here, about the time trend). Of course, this is not

20.
Jake Rosenfeld & Meredith Kleykamp, Organized Labor and Racial Wage Inequality in the
United States, 117 AM. J. SOC. 1460, 1468 (2012).
21.
See Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 15, at S61 fig.6. Yang also finds a shrinking of the
black–white happiness gap (albeit more modest than that observed by Stevenson and Wolfers) in Social
Inequalities in Happiness in the United States, 1972 to 2004: An Age–Period–Cohort Analysis, 73 AM.
SOC. REV. 204 (2008); and Long and Happy Living: Trends and Patterns of Happy Life Expectancy in
the U.S., 1970–2000, 37 SOC. SCI. RES. 1235 (2008).
22.
See Koen Decancq et al., The Evolution of World Inequality in Well-Being, 37 WORLD DEV.
11 (2009); Mark McGillivray & Nora Markova, Global Inequality in Well-Being Dimensions, 46 J.
DEV. STUD. 371 (2010).
23.
See Clayne Pope, Measuring the Distribution of Material Well-Being: U.S. Trends, 56 J.
MONETARY ECON. 66 (2009) (finding divergent long-term trends with respect to income versus nonincome inequality).
24.
See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY (2008).
25.
Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett have documented many correlations between income
inequality and social ills. See RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL (2009). Some
of these correlations surely reflect a causal linkage from income inequality to the correlated item—
although teasing apart mere correlation and causation is not easy.
26.
PIKETTY, supra note 2, at 291–300 figs.8.5, 8.6, 8.7 & 8.8.

5 ADLER 551-607 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

1/28/2015 2:55 PM

Equity by the Numbers

557

really surprising. What is less obvious is the deep connection among equity
metrics that I asserted at the beginning of this Introduction.
The central claim of this Article is that the Pigou-Dalton principle
constitutes that deep connection. The Pigou-Dalton principle both unifies
equity metrics, and differentiates them insofar as different metrics adopt
divergent specifications of the principle. The Pigou-Dalton principle is the
linchpin of equity, just as the Pareto principle is the linchpin of efficiency.27
So, first, the Article aims to popularize Pigou-Dalton. How many law
professors have never heard of the Pareto principle? How many are
familiar with Pigou-Dalton? And yet any law professor (or economist or
scholar of public health or . . . . ) who cares about equity ought to know
what the principle says.
So what it says is:
The Pigou-Dalton Principle
Assume that, in scenario x, one person has more of valuable
attribute C than a second person. In scenario y, the first person’s
level of C has decreased by some amount, and the second person’s
level of C has increased by the very same amount. In other words, a
“pure” (non-leaky) transfer of the attribute from the first person to
the second has occurred. However, this transfer is not so large as to
reverse their positions: in scenario y, the first person still has more
C or an equal amount of C as the second person. Finally, these are
the only two individuals affected (with respect to C) by the move
from x to y. Everyone else’s level of C in x is the same as her level
of C in y.28
Under these conditions, scenario y is more equitable than scenario
x. We have reduced the gap between the first person’s holdings of
C and the second’s, and have done so via a pure transfer—so that

27.
The principle can be traced to the work of A.C. Pigou and Hugh Dalton, and in the various
literatures on equity discussed below it is regularly given the name “Pigou-Dalton” (but not always,
sometimes instead being labeled, e.g., as the “principle of transfers”). See A.C. PIGOU, WEALTH AND
WELFARE 24 (1912); Hugh Dalton, The Measurement of the Inequality of Incomes, 30 ECON. J. 348,
351 (1920).
28.
Sometimes, the principle is formulated more broadly—allowing for a transfer that does
reverse the two individuals’ positions, but diminishes the difference in their holdings of C. It is more
straightforward, I believe, to provide a direct normative “story” for the narrower principle. See
MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 339–
40 (2012); infra Part II. However, if the currency C is well-being or some good proxy for well-being,
the two principles are equally normatively attractive, since the broader principle follows from the
narrower one given an axiom of “anonymity”: requiring that distributions of C which are the same
except for who receives various amounts be seen as equally equitable. If C is well-being (at least), the
anonymity axiom seems very powerful. See ADLER, supra, at 52.
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the first person cannot complain, as a matter of equity, about the
disparity between his loss and the other individual’s gain.
While its cousin, Pareto, comes “pre-specified” in terms of preferencesatisfaction, the Pigou-Dalton principle is unspecified. For what is the
valuable item C? Is it income? Utility? Happiness? Health?
Part I of the Article will show how the Pigou-Dalton principle, in some
form, underlies a wide range of equity metrics. I focus here on four families
of metrics, each the basis for much current scholarship as well as
information gathering by official statistical bureaus. Those families are
inequality metrics, poverty metrics, social-gradient metrics, and social
welfare functions. My survey of these tools will describe both traditional
approaches and newer, innovative techniques within the four families—
namely, so-called “multidimensional” poverty and inequality metrics,
inspired by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s work on “capabilities.”
Part I will explain how each of the four kinds of metrics satisfies the PigouDalton principle in terms of some “currency”: some specification of the
valuable attribute C.
Part II will explore the normative defensibility of the Pigou-Dalton
principle. Why does so much current thinking about equity presuppose that
principle? I offer one possible justification for the principle: a justification
which is “welfarist” in focusing on the connection between Pigou-Dalton
transfers and well-being and presupposing the possibility of interpersonal
well-being comparisons. Although alternative defenses of the principle are
certainly possible, it is the welfarist approach that I believe most
convincing, and present in Part II.
Part III and Part IV explore difficult questions about the specification
of the principle. Two key questions emerge from the survey of the four
families in Part I. First, what is the appropriate “currency” for the PigouDalton principle? Second, should the principle be applied in a restricted
form? As we shall see, both poverty metrics and social-gradient metrics—
in their own ways—limit the scope of the Pigou-Dalton principle. Poverty
metrics do not satisfy the principle with respect to transfers above the
poverty line, and social-gradient metrics only satisfy it for transfers from
higher to lower social status individuals.
Plausibly, the best defense of the social-class-restricted version of the
Pigou-Dalton principle relates to considerations of individual
responsibility. If Nadja is responsible for being worse off than Juan—if she
has frittered away her resources, while Juan has been prudent—then equity
no longer favors an improvement in her holdings at Juan’s expense. Now
imagine that Nadja is worse off than Juan because of her lower social
status. Surely that is not her responsibility. By restricting the Pigou-Dalton
principle to transfers from higher- to lower-social-status individuals, social-
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gradient metrics work to ensure that considerations of individual
responsibility do not vitiate the normative case for a transfer.
However, this defense of social-gradient metrics may be challenged.
Social class is a crude indicator of individual responsibility. The differing
statuses of Nadja and Juan may not, in fact, have been the cause of their
differential holdings of C. Moreover, Robert may have the same social
status as Juan, yet have less C without being responsible for this
differential. Shouldn’t the problem of responsibility be handled in a more
systematic way?
This question sets the stage for Part V, which explores an emerging,
fifth family of equity metrics: responsibility-sensitive metrics (sometimes
termed “equality-of-opportunity” metrics). Such metrics seek to demarcate
between an individual’s “circumstances” (for which she is not accountable)
and her “effort,” and to wash out differential effort in the measurement of
inequality. This is an exciting, new development in the measurement of
equity—and here, too, the Pigou-Dalton principle can be seen as
foundational. Responsibility-sensitive metrics satisfy the principle after
some kind of normalization for individual “effort.” For example, one such
metric, proposed by John Roemer—a pioneering figure in this field—
favors Pigou-Dalton transfers from someone who has more of the
appropriate “currency” to someone who has less, if they fall in the same
“effort” class.
This Article has three aims: descriptive, explanatory, and normative.
First, I hope to describe a variety of methodologies, each widely utilized,
for quantifying equity. Many readers will not be familiar with all or even
any of these methodologies. Second, I aim to shine a light on the PigouDalton principle, showing how that fundamental axiom of equity both
unites the methodologies, and yet also differentiates them insofar as the
methodologies choose to specify the principle in different ways. Finally, I
hope to excavate the normative debates underlying such differences in
specification. What is the best way to measure equity? This is a pretty
tough question to answer, but at least we can be clear about why it is so
hard.
I.

EQUITY METRICS: AN OVERVIEW

This Part describes four families of equity metrics, stressing how each
family—in its own way—is connected to the Pigou-Dalton principle. These
families, between them, comprise the overwhelming bulk of contemporary
scholarly work attempting to provide some kind of quantitative assessment
of equity.
Throughout the Article, I will speak of a “Pigou-Dalton transfer”
occurring with respect to some particular “currency”—income, utility,
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happiness, etc.—and an equity metric satisfying the “Pigou-Dalton
principle” with respect to some currency. A Pigou-Dalton transfer, with
respect to a given currency, means a non-leaky transfer of the currency
from someone who has more to someone who has less, still leaving the first
person with a greater than or equal amount of the currency and changing no
one else’s holdings of it. A given metric satisfies the Pigou-Dalton
principle with respect to a given currency, if it necessarily counts a PigouDalton transfer in that currency as reducing the degree of inequity.
A. Inequality Metrics
Traditional measures of inequality are unidimensional. They focus on
the distribution of some single attribute in a population. The most popular
unidimensional inequality measures are the Gini coefficient; variancebased measures, such as the coefficient of variation; the Theil index; and
the Atkinson index.29
For the most part, unidimensional inequality metrics have been used by
scholars to study the distribution of income (or some other economic
“currency,” such as wages, wealth, or consumption). But nothing in the
formal structure of such metrics requires that income, or another economic
attribute, be the input. All that is required is (1) information sufficient to
estimate the distribution of the attribute in the population of interest (and
the distribution’s intertemporal path, if time trends in inequality are being
quantified), and (2) some cardinal scale for measuring the attribute.30
Thus, a burgeoning body of work looks at the inequality of longevity or
some cardinal measure of health.31 And if the researcher is comfortable

29.
For overviews of the theory of unidimensional inequality metrics, see HILDE BOJER,
DISTRIBUTIONAL JUSTICE: THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 63–133 (2003); SATYA R. CHAKRAVARTY,
INEQUALITY, POLARIZATION, AND POVERTY ch. 1 (2009); FRANK A. COWELL, MEASURING
INEQUALITY (3d ed., 2011); PETER J. LAMBERT, THE DISTRIBUTION AND REDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
1–132 (3d ed., 2001); Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert & David Donaldson, Income Inequality
Measurement: The Normative Approach, in HANDBOOK ON INCOME INEQUALITY MEASUREMENT 133
(Jacques Silber ed., 1999); Frank Cowell, Measurement of Inequality, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INCOME
DISTRIBUTION 87 (Anthony Atkinson & Francois Bourguignon eds., 2000); Frank Cowell, Inequality
and Poverty Measures, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY (Matthew D.
Adler & Marc Fleurbaey eds., forthcoming 2015); Bhaskar Dutta, Inequality, Poverty and Welfare, in
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 597 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 2002).
30.
By “cardinal,” here, I mean that the attribute is measurable on a scale which is finer than an
ordinal scale—a scale that captures more than the levels of the attributes, e.g., differences between the
levels, or ratios. Standard income inequality metrics assume either that income is measurable up to ratio
rescalings, or up to a common translation factor. See CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, at 15–22;
Blackorby, Bossert & Donaldson, supra note 29, at 144–51.
Some recent scholarship attempts to devise inequality metrics for attributes measured on an
ordinal scale. See Dutta & Foster, supra note 15; Frank A. Cowell & Emmanuel Flachaire, Inequality
with Ordinal Data (London Sch. of Econ., 2014), available at http://darp.lse.ac.uk/pdf/IneqOrdinal.pdf.
31.
See, e.g., ANGUS S. DEATON & CHRISTINA H. PAXSON, Aging and Inequality in Income and
Health, 88 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers & Proc.) 248 (1998); Edwards & Tuljapurkar, supra note 14; Neal
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converting answers to a happiness survey to a cardinal scale, then the
“currency” for the Gini coefficient, etc., can be happiness.32
The so-called “Lorenz curve” is the conceptual foundation for
unidimensional inequality metrics. (See Figure 1.) Consider, to begin, two
populations with the same population size and same average individual
level of the attribute (for example, the same average income), but different
distributions. The Lorenz curve of a given distribution arranges individuals
in rank order, from those who have the least amount of the attribute, to
those who have the most. For each group of individuals along this spectrum
(the lowest-ranked individual, the lowest- and second-lowest ranked
individuals, the three lowest-ranked individuals, etc.), the group’s
percentage of the total number of individuals in the entire population is
mapped onto their share of the total amount of the attribute in the
population. For example, if the first 5% of the population earns 1% of total
income, and the first 10% earns 3% of total income, the Lorenz curve
would include the points (5%, 1%) and (10%, 3%).
The axiom of “Lorenz dominance” says that if the Lorenz curve for one
distribution is sometimes inside the Lorenz curve for a second, and never
outside, then an inequality metric should assign the first distribution a
lower inequality number (degree of inequality).33 Lorenz dominance is
generally seen as the most fundamental axiom that an inequality metric
should satisfy, and indeed the standard metrics do satisfy it.34 The axiom of
Lorenz dominance is very intuitive: if one distribution Lorenz-dominates a
second, then—in a very clear and intuitive sense—it is “closer” to perfect
equality than the second. Where standard inequality metrics differ is in how

Fann et. al., Maximizing Health Benefits and Minimizing Inequality: Incorporating Local-Scale Data in
the Design and Evaluation of Air Quality Policies, 31 RISK ANAL. 908 (2011); Mark McGillivray et.
al., Health Inequality and Deprivation, 18 HEALTH ECON. (Supplement) S1 (2009); Peltzman, supra
note 12; Pope, supra note 23; David E. Sahn & Stephen D. Younger, Measuring Intra-Household
Health Inequality: Explorations Using the Body Mass Index, 18 HEALTH ECON. (Supplement) S13
(2009).
32.
See sources cited supra note 21.
33.
Let (π, L(π)) be the Lorenz curve for one distribution, where π is the fraction of the total
population in a given group of rank-ordered individuals, and L(π) their fraction of the total population
holdings of the attribute. Let (π, L*(π)) be the Lorenz curve for a second distribution. Then this second
curve Lorenz-dominates the first if L*(π) ≥ L(π) for all π, with this inequality strict for some.
34.
Note that a perfectly equal distribution of the attribute will Lorenz-dominate every other
distribution.
Recall that we are focusing here on two distributions with the same population size and the same mean.
In that case all standard inequality metrics satisfy the axiom of Lorenz dominance. In a more general
case, we might draw Lorenz curves for two distributions with the same population sizes but different
means. In this case, so-called relative inequality metrics (those that assign the same degree of inequality
to a distribution and all ratio rescalings) will continue to satisfy Lorenz dominance, but other kinds of
inequality metrics need not.. The most widely-used inequality metrics—the coefficient of variation,
Gini, Atkinson, and Theil—are relative metrics. See CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, ch. 1 (discussing
relative and absolute metrics); COWELL, supra note 29, at 61–74 (discussing relative metrics under
heading of “income scale independence”).
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be reached from the second by a series of Pigou-Dalton transfers (plus
perhaps a permutation).35
For example, imagine that there are four individuals in the population,
and that they begin with the unequal distribution (70, 95, 110, 125), where
70 is the amount of the attribute held by Individual 1 (e.g., $70,000 in
annual income if the attribute is income), 95 the amount of the attribute
held by Individual 2, etc. The sum total of the attribute is 400. This
distribution corresponds to a Lorenz curve whereby the first 25% of the
population has 70/400 of the total attribute, the first 50% has 165/400 of
the total, and the first 75% has 275/400 of the total.
That distribution is (of course) Lorenz-dominated by a perfectly equal
distribution (100, 100, 100, 100). The starting point (70, 95, 110, 125) can
be turned into perfect equality via the following series of Pigou-Dalton
transfers: from the starting point to (70, 100, 105, 125), to (75, 100, 100,
125), to (100, 100, 100, 100).36
The distribution is also Lorenz-dominated by the unequal distribution
(75, 92, 113, 120)—a distribution “closer” to perfect equality. Why? Note
that in this second distribution the first 25% of the population has 75/400 of
the total (a greater percentage than 70/400); the first 50% of the population
has 167/400 (which exceeds 165/400); and the first 75% has 280/400
(which exceeds 275/400). Moreover, the Lorenz-dominating distribution
(75, 92, 113, 120) can be reached from the starting point (70, 95, 110, 125)
via the following series of Pigou-Dalton transfers: from the starting point to
(75, 90, 110, 125), to (75, 90, 115, 120), to (75, 92, 113, 120). The “magic”
of the Pigou-Dalton transfer, as proved by Hardy, Littlewood and Polya, is
that this will be true for every case in which one distribution (perfectly
equal or not) Lorenz-dominates a second.
I have focused thus far on the inequality ranking of two distributions
with the same population size and mean. Unidimensional inequality metrics

35.
See GODFREY H. HARDY, JOHN E. LITTLEWOOD & GEORGE POLYA, INEQUALITIES (1934);
ALBERT W. MARSHALL & INGRAM OLKIN, INEQUALITIES: THEORY OF MAJORIZATION AND ITS
APPLICATIONS 21–22 (Richard Bellman, ed.) (1979) (reproducing the Hardy/Littlewood/Polya
theorem). Although the theorem is formulated in terms of Pigou-Dalton transfers in the broader sense of
gap-diminishing transfers, see supra note 28, the proof strategy also shows that: one distribution is
Lorenz-dominated by a second if and only if there is a series of Pigou-Dalton transfers in the narrower
sense discussed in this Article (non-rank-switching transfers), combined perhaps with a permutation of
individuals’ holdings, that leads from the first distribution to the second. To see why a permutation may
be needed, consider the distribution among two individuals (30, 70), with 30 the holdings of the first
individual, and the distribution (60, 40). The second distribution Lorenz-dominates the first, and can be
generated from the first by a Pigou-Dalton transfer of 10, yielding (40, 60); and then a permutation to
yield (60, 40). Clearly a Pigou-Dalton transfer in the narrower sense alone will never get us from (30,
70) to (60, 40).
36.
The second distribution is reached from the starting point via a Pigou-Dalton transfer of 5
from the third individual to the second; the third distribution from the second via a Pigou-Dalton
transfer of 5 from the third individual to the first; and the perfectly equal distribution from the third
distribution via a Pigou-Dalton transfer of 25 from the fourth individual to the first.
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can be (and often are) employed to compare distributions with different
means, population sizes, or both. In such a case, the Pigou-Dalton principle
does not directly constrain inequality measurement.37 However, it shapes
such assessment indirectly, if quantification is undertaken using a metric
(Gini, coefficient of variation, Theil, etc.) that is sure to respect the PigouDalton principle in every case where the principle does apply.
Multidimensional inequality metrics have recently become popular.38
This development coincides with theoretical and empirical work on
“capabilities” and “functionings.”39 A key theme in the capabilities/
functionings literature is the multiplicity of determinants of individual wellbeing. An individual’s welfare cannot be reduced to her income, her health,
her social and professional life, or the quality of her leisure, etc., but
depends upon all of these, and more.
One response to this (undeniably true) proposition about well-being is
to construct some inclusive measure of individual well-being that integrates
information about each individual’s multidimensional attainments, and then
to use this all-things-considered number as the “currency” for a
unidimensional inequality metric or social welfare function.40
But multidimensional inequality metrics do not take this path. Instead,
two other routes are pursued:
a) Dimension-by-dimension assessment. The simplest approach is to
apply a unidimensional inequality metric to each of the several
dimensions about which the researcher has distributional data; and
then take an average (or some similar function41) of these
dimensional numbers. For example, if there is data about the
distribution of income, health, and educational attainment (each
37.
If there has been a pure transfer, without any other change, then necessarily neither the
population nor the mean level of the attribute has changed.
38.
See CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, ch.5 ; Asis Kumar Banerjee, A Multidimensional Gini
Index, 60 MATHEMATICAL SOC. SCI. 87 (2010); Satya R. Chakravarty & Maria Ana Lugo,
Multidimensional Indicators, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY (Matthew
D. Adler & Marc Fleurbaey eds., forthcoming 2015); Jean-Yves Duclos et al., Partial Multidimensional
Inequality Orderings, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 225 (2011); Esfandiar Maasoumi, Multidimensioned
Approaches to Welfare Analysis, in HANDBOOK ON INCOME INEQUALITY MEASUREMENT 437 (Jacques
Silber ed., 1999); Ernesto Savaglio, Three Approaches to the Analysis of Multidimensional Inequality,
in INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 269 (Francesco Farina & Ernesto Savaglio eds., 2006);
John Weymark, The Normative Approach to the Measurement of Multidimensional Inequality, in
INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra, at 303.
39.
See, e.g., SABINA ALKIRE, VALUING FREEDOMS (2002); WIEBKE KUKLYS, AMARTYA SEN’S
CAPABILITY APPROACH (2005); THE CAPABILITY APPROACH: CONCEPTS, MEASURES AND
APPLICATIONS (Flavio Comim et al. eds, 2008); Ingrid Robeyns, The Capability Approach: A
Theoretical Survey, 6 J. HUM. DEVELOPMENT 93 (2005). The field is inspired by Martha Nussbaum’s
and Amartya Sen’s scholarship. See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:
THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000); AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992).
40.
See ADLER, supra note 28, at 119–24.
41.
By “similar,” here, I mean that the overall inequality assigned to a multidimensional
distribution is monotonically increasing in inequality in each of the dimensions.
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cardinally measured), we might estimate multidimensional
inequality as the average of the Gini coefficient of income, health,
and educational attainment.
b) “Sophisticated” multidimensional inequality metrics. The
dimension-by-dimension format has various deficits. In particular,
it ignores interdimensional correlations. (Imagine that two
populations have the very same distributions of income, health, and
educational attainment—taken separately—but in the first case
those with higher incomes tend to have better health and education,
while in the second case there are no systematic connections
between an individual’s health, income, and education. Then,
surely, the second distribution is more equitable.)
“Sophisticated”42 multidimensional metrics are (mathematically
complicated) formulas for assigning an inequality number to a
multidimensional distribution—formulas which are not merely an
average or some other function of the inequality in each dimension
taken separately.
How do multidimensional inequality tools link up with the PigouDalton principle? For the dimension-by-dimension approach, the answer is
straightforward. A Pigou-Dalton transfer in any dimension will decrease
the degree of inequality in that dimension and thus will decrease the
average of dimension-specific inequality.43 For “sophisticated”
multidimensional metrics, the answer is more complex. Such metrics
typically satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle with respect to coordinated
transfers, which (depending on the metric) can mean either that (1) a
bundle of Pigou-Dalton transfers between two individuals, in each and
every dimension, reduces the degree of inequality assigned to a
multidimensional distribution;44 or that (2) a Pigou-Dalton transfer in at
least one dimension, from an individual who is at a higher level in all

42.
“Sophisticated” is not a standard term in the literature, but rather one that I use here to mean
any approach to measuring multidimensional inequality other than dimension-by-dimension
assessment. Such an approach is “sophisticated” in the sense that it can take account of
interdimensional correlations.
43.
It will also decrease the value of any other function monotonically increasing in dimensionspecific inequality, see supra note 41.
44.
More precisely, a standard multidimensional Pigou-Dalton principle says that a bundle of
equiproportional dimension-specific Pigou-Dalton transfers between two individuals—equiproportional
in the sense that the distance between the individuals on each dimension is reduced by the same
fraction—decreases multidimensional inequality. See Weymark, supra note 38, at 307; ADLER, supra
note 28, at 131 n.140. The literature on multidimensional metrics also discusses a “majorization”
axiom, requiring inequality to decrease if a multidimensional distribution is multiplied by a bistochastic
matrix. An inequality metric which satisfies this majorization axiom will also satisfy the
equiproportional Pigou-Dalton principle just mentioned. See Weymark, supra, at 308.
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dimensions, to an individual at a lower level in all dimensions, reduces the
assigned degree of inequality.45
B. Social Welfare Functions
Social welfare functions (SWFs) are much discussed in theoretical
welfare economics; are widely used in some fields of applied economics,
particularly optimal tax scholarship; and provide the intellectual foundation
for cost-benefit analysis with distributional weights. An SWF takes
information about the population distribution of individual attainments (be
it attainment on a single dimension, or on multiple dimensions), and uses a
“utility” function to convert that information into a list of “utility”
numbers—one for each individual. Distributions are then ranked on the
basis of these utility numbers.46
SWFs can assume various functional forms. One such form, the most
famous, is utilitarian. The utilitarian SWF compares two distributions by
summing utilities. The utilitarian SWF may respect the Pigou-Dalton
principle with respect to income. This depends on how the translation of
income into utility occurs. If this translation is non-linear, and in particular
is such that income has “diminishing marginal utility,” the utilitarian SWF
will satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle with respect to income.
But the utilitarian SWF clearly does not respect the Pigou-Dalton
principle “in the space of utility.” Assume that there are four individuals. In
scenario x, the individuals have various attainments, translated into the list
of utilities (30, 140, 70, 80). In scenario y, the attainments are different, so
that the utilities become (60, 110, 70, 80). Thus, in scenario y, there has
been a Pigou-Dalton transfer in utility (30 units) from Individual 2 to
Individual 1. But the sum totals of utility are the same, and hence
utilitarianism ranks the scenarios as equally good.
However, there are important classes of SWFs that satisfy the PigouDalton principle in the space of utility (for short, “equity-regarding”
SWFs). “Continuous prioritarian” SWFs47 sum utility numbers
45.
See Casilda Lasso de la Vega et al., Characterizing Multidimensional Inequality Measures
Which Fulfill the Pigou-Dalton Bundle Principle, 35 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 319 (2010). On the
Pigou-Dalton principle in the multidimensional context, see also sources cited supra note 38; Henar
Diez et al., A Consistent Multidimensional Generalization of the Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle: An
Analysis, 7 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON. art. 45 (2007); Kristof Bosmans et al., Note: A Consistent
Multidimensional Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle, 144 J. ECON. THEORY 1358 (2009).
46.
By “utility,” I mean a measure of well-being that is both intra- and interpersonally
comparable, and makes intrapersonal comparisons in conformity with individuals’ preferenes. See infra
Part III. For a comprehensive discussion of social welfare functions, see ADLER, supra note 28. On
their functional forms, see id. ch. 5. For citations to scholarship on SWFs, see id. at 83 n.45, 87 n.56.
For a recent survey, see John Weymark, Social Welfare Functions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELLBEING AND PUBLIC POLICY (Matthew D. Adler & Marc Fleurbaey eds., forthcoming 2015).
47.
See ADLER, supra note 28, at 356–58.
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planation: Thee continuous prrioritarian SW
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u iss the utility of a particular in
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with
h utility uj), to an individual at a lower utillity level (heree, individual i,
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sum of g((u). Because g((.) is concave,
g(ui + ∆u) – g(ui) is greater thaan g(uj) – g(uj − ∆u), as the figure shows.
Thiss in turn mean
ns that g(ui + ∆u) + g(uj – ∆u) is greaterr than g(ui) +
g(uj).
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The Pigou-Dalton principle in the space of utility is also satisfied by
other SWFs, such as the rank-weighted and leximin SWFs.48 Continuous
prioritarian, leximin, and rank-weighted SWFs are the prime examples of
equity-regarding SWFs.49 All three are structured (in somewhat different
ways) to give greater weight to utility changes affecting individuals at
lower utility levels, as compared to individuals at higher levels.
What is the difference between ranking distributions using an
inequality metric with utility as the currency, and ranking such distributions
using an equity-regarding SWF? A critical difference is that the first
technique ignores the sum total of utility. (For example, if everyone’s
utility doubles, an inequality metric with utility as its currency will record
no change,50 while an SWF will see an improvement.) Inequality metrics
are only measures of inequality. Equity-regarding SWFs are hybrid
measures, taking into account both information about total well-being (the
sum total of utility) and information about the degree of equality of utility.
However, the key point to stress here is the similarity between equityregarding SWFs and inequality metrics: namely, that both respect the
Pigou-Dalton principle in some fashion. By contrast, with the utilitarian
SWF—which does not respect the Pigou-Dalton principle in the space of
utility, and does so in the space of income only if the translation from
income to utility is such that income has diminishing marginal utility—an
equity-regarding SWF always respects a Pigou-Dalton transfer in the space
of utility.51 Note that, in the case of a non-leaky transfer in utility from a
higher utility to a lower utility individual, total well-being is a “wash” and
the equality of utility becomes the only consideration driving the equityregarding SWF. If, in addition, the transfer is a Pigou-Dalton transfer,
shrinking the utility gap between the two individuals, the transfer reduces

48.
The leximin SWF ranks utility vectors according to the worst-off utilities; if these are equal,
the second-worst-off; and so forth. See ADLER, supra note 28, at 367–74. It is obvious that this SWF
satisfies the Pigou-Dalton principle. The rank-weighted SWF orders utility numbers from lowest to
highest, and sums these multiplied by fixed, decreasing weights. See id. at 351–56. The rank-weighted
SWF can also be shown to satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle. See id. at 353.
49.
These are certainly not the only SWFs that respect the Pigou-Dalton principle. See, e.g.,
ADLER, supra note 28, at 374–77 (discussing prioritarian SWF with a lexical threshold). However,
these are the three such SWFs that are by far the most widely used in scholarly work in the SWF
tradition.
50.
Strictly speaking, this is true for relative inequality metrics, while absolute inequality metrics
will be invariant to increases in overall well-being that occur by increasing everyone’s utility by the
same amount. On the difference between such metrics, see CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, at 16. Either
type of metric will assign the same value to utility vectors in which everyone’s utility is equal,
regardless of the total.
51.
Note that, because SWFs take utility numbers (not attributes) as their inputs, an SWF can be
structured to respect the Pigou-Dalton principle in the space of utility regardless of the mapping from
individual attributes to utility levels—and this is true of the continuous prioritarian, rank-weighted, and
leximin SWFs.
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the inequality of utility and is preferred by the equity-regarding SWF, just
as it would be by an inequality metric with utility as the currency.
C. Poverty Metrics
Traditionally, poverty measurement focused on income poverty (just as
inequality metrics were first developed to measure income inequality).
Formally, an income-poverty metric is a function of the distribution of
individual incomes—with two critical differences from income-inequality
measures.52 First, poverty measurement also depends on the identification
of a poverty line. Various approaches are adopted here: the income-poverty
line can be specified in an “absolute” fashion (as the amount of income
required to meet minimum nutritional requirements or other basic needs);
or a “relative” fashion (as some fraction of the mean or median income).53
The poverty line permits the characterization of individuals as “poor”
or not: a “poor” individual is someone whose income is below the line. But
it also undergirds the so-called “focus” requirement: if Z is the poverty line,
and distributions d and dʹ have the same pattern of incomes below Z, then
the degree of poverty for the two distributions is the same.54
Because of the focus requirement, the connection between poverty
metrics and the Pigou-Dalton axiom is less straightforward than for
inequality metrics. A logical consequence of the “focus” requirement is that
above-threshold transfers have no effect on the degree of poverty. This is
intuitive. Assume that distribution d is (10, 15, 30, 60, 100), while dʹ is (10,
15, 50, 50, 90). The numbers represent annual incomes with five
individuals in total and the poverty line is, let us assume, 25. Note that dʹ is
reached from d via a series of two Pigou-Dalton transfers.55 Distribution dʹ
therefore Lorenz-dominates d; and the Gini coefficient, Theil index,
coefficient of variation, or any other standard inequality metric will assign
a lower degree of inequality to dʹ than d. But every standard poverty metric
(by virtue of the focus requirement) will say that the degree of poverty in d
and dʹ is exactly the same.

52.
On income-poverty metrics, see CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, ch. 2; LAMBERT, supra note
29, ch. 6; Dutta, supra note 29; Buhong Zheng, Aggregate Poverty Measures, 11 J. ECON. SURV. 123
(1997).
53.
On the setting of poverty lines, see Martin Ravallion, Poverty Lines Across the World (World
Bank Dev.Res. Grp., Working Paper No. 5284 April 2010).
54.
See CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, at 50; Zheng, supra note 52, at 130. Note that poverty
metrics generally can compare two distributions, given the two, possibly different, poverty lines
associated with each distribution—but that the focus axiom is expressed with reference to the case in
which the same line is used for two distributions.
55.
First transfer 10 from the fifth individual to the third, then transfer 10 from the fourth to the
third.
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Still, the “focus” requirement is consistent with restricted versions of
the Pigou-Dalton principle, such as the following56:
(1) Below-Threshold Transfers: A Pigou-Dalton transfer
between two poor individuals lowers the degree of poverty.
(2) Across-Threshold Transfers (weak version): If one
individual is poor, and a second non-poor,57 a Pigou-Dalton
transfer between them that does not change their positions
relative to the poverty line (i.e., does not change the number of
poor and non-poor individuals) lowers the degree of poverty.
(3) Across-Threshold Transfers (strong version): If one
individual is poor, and a second non-poor, a Pigou-Dalton
transfer between them lowers the degree of poverty even if it
changes the number of poor individuals.
In the theoretical literature on the measurement of income poverty, the
first and second axioms are generally endorsed. The third is more
controversial;58 consider a case in which a Pigou-Dalton transfer increases
the number of poor individuals (i.e., the mean income of transferor and
transferee is below the poverty line, and the transfer is sufficiently large to
bring the transferor below that line).
Whether the third axiom should be accepted depends on broader
questions about the normative role of poverty measures, mooted below.
The basic point, here, is that the “focused” structure of poverty measures
precludes their satisfying the Pigou-Dalton principle with respect to
transfers above the poverty line—but, reciprocally, permits their satisfying
restricted versions of the Pigou-Dalton principle (such as (1), (2), or (3)),
applicable to a transfer that increases the income of someone who starts out
below the poverty line.

56.
Statements of the Pigou-Dalton principle as a condition on poverty metrics, such as those
immediately below, constrain the poverty measure of two distributions using a common poverty line.
For a discussion of different versions of the Pigou-Dalton principle for poverty metrics, see sources
cited supra note 52. See also Lucio Esposita & Peter J. Lambert, Poverty Measurement:
Prioritarianism, Sufficiency and the ‘I’s of Poverty, 27 ECON. & PHIL 109 (2011); Buhong Zheng,
Poverty Orderings, 14 J. ECON. SURVEYS 427 (2000). Zheng, supra note 52, is especially systematic.
57.
Strictly, a “non-poor” individual is someone whose income places her at or above the poverty
line. See Zheng, supra note 52 (noting that a “weak” definition of the poor avoids certain axiomatic
difficulties that arise if individuals at the poverty line are counted as “poor”). However, so as to
simplify matters, my discussion of the non-poor is focused on the paradigmatic case of individuals
whose holdings place them above the poverty line. My claims generalize to “non-poor” individuals
who are right at the poverty line. Most fundamentally, note that regardless of whether the term “nonpoor” is used to include or exclude those right at the poverty line, poverty metrics are invariably
“restricted” in the sense of ignoring Pigou-Dalton transfers among individuals above the poverty line.
58.
See CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, at 53; Zheng, supra note 52, at 133.
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One of the most popular classes of poverty metrics in academic work is
the FGT class.59 The FGT approach calculates each poor individual’s
fractional shortfall from the poverty line (with others assigned a value of
zero) and then averages these numbers raised to some power α. If this α
parameter is greater than 1, the FGT approach satisfies all three of the
above Pigou-Dalton axioms.
Admittedly, some poverty metrics employed in empirical research (or
by governmental statistical bureaus) go to the other extreme and fail to
satisfy any one of these axioms. This is true, in particular, of the headcount
ratio: the percentage of the population that is poor.60 But the headcount
ratio is often criticized in theoretical work on poverty measurement
(beginning with a seminal critique by Amartya Sen, in a 1976 article61)
because it wholly ignores the distribution of income among poor
individuals and thus is insensitive to transfers (be they from poor to poor or
from rich to poor) that change this distribution but do not change the
numbers of poor and non-poor.
The recent rise of the “multidimensional” approach to inequality
measurement is mirrored by similar work on poverty metrics—in both
cases, fueled by a desire to move “beyond income” as an indicator of
human well-being.62 Assume, now, that d is a multidimensional distribution

59.
See Udo Ebert & Patrick Moyes, A Simple Axiomatization of the Foster, Greer & Thorbecke
Poverty Orderings, 4 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 455 (2002); James Foster, Joel Greer, & Erik Thorbecke,
The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) Poverty Measures: 25 Years Later, 8 J. ECON. INEQUALITY 491
(2010). Let Z be the income poverty line, and yi the income of individual i or Z, whichever is smaller.
With N individuals, the FGT index is:

 Z − yi 


i =1 
N
 Z 
1

N

α

.

60.
See Zheng, supra note 52, at 142–44.
61.
Amartya Sen, Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement, 2 ECONOMETRICA 219 (1976).
See also AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 102–04 (1992). Sen notes in the latter work that
“[t]he need for having distribution-sensitivity in measuring poverty [i.e., a sensitivity of the metric to
the distribution of income among the poor] seems to be fairly widely accepted by now.” Id. at 106.
62.
See Sabina Alkire, Capabilities, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC
POLICY (Matthew D. Adler & Marc Fleurbaey eds., forthcoming 2015); CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29,
ch. 6; Satya Chakravarty and Maria Ana Lugo, Multidimensional Indicators, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY (Matthew D. Adler & Marc Fleurbaey eds., forthcoming 2015); THE
MANY DIMENSIONS OF POVERTY (Nanak Kakwani & Jacques Silber eds., 2007); QUANTITATIVE
APPROACHES TO MULTIDIMENSIONAL POVERTY MEASUREMENT (Nanak Kakwani & Jacques Silber
eds., 2008); Sabina Alkire & James Foster, Counting and Multidimensional Poverty Measurement, 96 J.
PUB. ECON. 476 (2011) [hereinafter Alkire & Foster, Counting and Multidimensional Poverty
Measurement]; Sabina Alkire & James Foster, Understandings and Misunderstandings of
Multidimensional Poverty Measurement, 9 J. ECON. INEQUALITY 289 (2011) [hereinafter Alkire &
Foster, Understandings and Misunderstandings]; Sabina Alkire & Maria Emma Santos, A
Multidimensional Approach: Poverty Measurement & Beyond, 112 SOCIAL INDICATORS RES. 239
(2013); A.B. Atkinson, Multidimensional Deprivation: Contrasting Social Welfare and Counting
Approaches, 1 J. ECON. INEQUALITY 51 (2003); Francois Bourguignon & Satya R. Chakravarty, The
Measurement of Multidimensional Poverty, 1 J. ECON. INEQUALITY 25 (2003); Jean-Yves Duclos et al.,
Robust Multidimensional Poverty Comparisons, 116 ECON. J. 943 (2006); Martin Ravallion, On
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(describing individual attainments with respect to a multiplicity of welfarerelevant attributes). A multidimensional poverty metric, like its inequality
counterpart, will assign some number to this distribution—with the critical
difference that this number depends not just on the pattern of individual
attainments but also on the identification of dimension-specific thresholds.
For example, if d describes individuals’ levels of the three attributes
income, health, and education, then the researcher will need to specify a
separate threshold (poverty line) for income, for health, and for
education—e.g., a minimum level of income, health, and education,
respectively, required for a decent human life.
What is the structure of multidimensional poverty metrics? Here, as
with multidimensional inequality measurement, one can differentiate
between (1) dimension-by-dimension and (2) “sophisticated” approaches.63
The dimension-by-dimension approach will employ some metric M
traditionally employed to calculate income poverty (for example, the
headcount ratio, the FGT metric, or any other); will apply it to each of the
dimensions; and will then take an average (or some similar function)64 of
these dimension-specific poverty values. If M would satisfy a restricted
version of the Pigou-Dalton principle, when applied to income, then the
dimension-by-dimension approach using M will satisfy the very same
principle on an attribute-by-attribute basis.
For example, assume that M, applied to an income distribution,
satisfies the axiom of “below-threshold transfers”: a Pigou-Dalton transfer
from one person with a below-threshold income to a second with an even
lower income reduces the degree of poverty according to M. Now imagine
that multidimensional distribution dʹ is reached from d by a transfer on any
dimension from someone below the threshold for that dimension to
someone even lower. Then the dimension-by-dimension approach using M
will say that the degree of poverty is lower in dʹ than d.
Research on “sophisticated” multidimensional poverty metrics is quite
new, and it is hard to be sure about what will emerge. A leading contender
seems to be the “Alkire-Foster” index of multidimensional poverty, which
builds upon the FGT formula.65 Roughly speaking, Alkire and Foster
propose to identify an individual as “poor” if she has below-threshold

Multidimensional Indices of Poverty, 9 J. ECON. INEQUALITY 235 (2011); Kai-yuen Tsui,
Multidimensional Poverty Indices, 19 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 69 (2002).
63.
See Alkire & Foster, Understandings and Misunderstandings, supra note 62, at 303–04
(criticizing “marginal,” i.e., dimension-by-dimension approach because it “does not look across
dimensions for the same person and cannot reflect the extent of associations among deprivations”).
64.
See supra note 41.
65.
See Alkire & Foster, Counting and Multidimensional Poverty Measurement, supra note 62;
Alkire & Foster, Understandings and Misunderstandings, supra note 62; Alkire & Santos, supra note
62.
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attainments in a sufficient number of dimensions.66 Poor individuals are
assigned a deprivation value in each dimension, equaling their fractional
shortfall from the dimension-specific line. Non-poor individuals are
assigned a deprivation value of 0 in each dimension. These values, raised to
the power α, are summed across individuals and dimensions.
The Alkire-Foster formula differs from a dimension-by-dimension
approach, because its identification of an individual as “poor” depends
upon her attainments in all the dimensions, and this identification, in turn,
helps determine the deprivation numbers assigned to each individual. Still,
the approach satisfies a version of the Pigou-Dalton principle: a transfer on
any dimension from one poor individual to a second reduces the degree of
poverty.67
D. Social-Gradient Metrics
The social-gradient view of equity is adopted in much research on
public health and in the literature on environmental justice.68 On this view,
the population-wide distribution of income, health, utility, happiness, or
any other attribute lacks normative relevance as such. Rather, what is
relevant is the association between valuable or harmful attributes and
markers of social status. As a leading researcher explains: “[E]quity in
health can be defined as the absence of systematic disparities in
health . . . between social groups who have different levels of underlying
social advantage/disadvantage—that is, different positions in a social
hierarchy.”69 Social status is proxied in a number of different ways.
“Analytical traditions vary [on how to choose the proxy]: in the United
Kingdom, social groups have been defined using five categories of
occupation-based social class; in some countries in continental Europe,
educational attainment or occupational categories have been used; and in

66.
Their approach to characterizing a person as “poor” also allows for differential weighting of
dimensions.
67.
This assumes (as with the FGT metric for the unidimensional case) that α > 1. Note that a
Pigou-Dalton transfer in one dimension to a person who is below the dimension-specific threshold, but
is not “poor” (i.e., is not below the threshold on a sufficient number of dimensions), will not reduce the
degree of poverty as per the Alkire-Foster metric. This is true regardless of where the individual ends
up relative to the dimension-specific threshold, and of where the transferor starts out or ends up.
By contrast, the dimension-by-dimension application of a unidimensional poverty metric that satisfies
some version of the Pigou-Dalton principle will record such a transfer as reducing poverty, at least in
some cases (depending on the positions of the transferee and transferor relative to the dimensionspecific threshold.). In particular, the dimension-by-dimension application of the FGT metric will
always record such a transfer as reducing poverty.
68.
See Matthew D. Adler, Risk Equity: A New Proposal, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6–11
(2008) (citing literature).
69.
Paula Braveman & Sofia Gruskin, Defining Equity in Health, 57 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY.
HEALTH 254, 254 (2003).
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the USA, most research focuses on social categories defined in terms of
racial groups.”70
A variety of tools are employed to measure the association between
social class and harms or benefits.71 Many such tools satisfy the PigouDalton principle in some form. In outlining this connection, I will focus on
the “concentration index”—increasingly favored by researchers as one of
the best social-gradient metrics because it integrates information about
attainments in all social groups.72
Imagine that the population is divided into G social groups, with Group
1 at the bottom of the social hierarchy, Group 2 in the second-worst social
position, etc. There is a distribution, d, which distributes some valuable
attribute to the members of each of the G groups.73 The so-called
“concentration curve” for this distribution is drawn as follows. For each
group, in succession, we plot the percentage of the population belonging to
that group and all lower status groups against the percentage of the total
amount of the attribute held by those groups. For example, if there are three
groups of low, middle, and high status, with respectively 20%, 70%, and
10% of the population; and the total amount of the attribute held by each
group is, respectively, 5, 45, and 50; then the concentration curve includes
the points (0,0), (20%, 5%), (90%, 50%), and (100%, 100%).
The “concentration index” for a given distribution d, then, is twice
the area between its concentration curve and the 45-degree line.74 The
higher the value for this index, the more the attribute is “concentrated” in
higher-status groups. See Figure 3.

70.
C.J.L. Murray et al., Health Inequalities and Social Group Differences: What Should We
Measure?, 77 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 537, 538 (1999).
71.
For descriptions of many of these, see Paula Braveman, Health Disparities and Health
Equity: Concepts and Measurement, 27 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 167, 172–79 (2006); Johann
Mackenbach & Anton E. Kunst, Measuring the Magnitude of Socio-economic Inequalities in Health, 44
SOC. SCI. & MED. 757 (1997); Adam Wagstaff et al., On the Measurement of Inequalities in Health, 33
SOC. SCI. & MED. 545 (1991).
72.
See Nicolas Ziebarth, Measurement of Health, Health Inequality, and Reporting
Heterogeneity, 71 SOC. SCI. MED. 116, 117 (2010) (noting that the concentration index is “by far the
dominant health inequality indicator”). For descriptions of the index and its properties, see Philip
Clarke & Tom Van Ourti, Calculating the Concentration Index when Income is Grouped, 29 J. HEALTH
ECON. 151 (2010); Guido Erreygers, Correcting the Concentration Index, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 504
(2009); Nanak Kakwani et al., Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health: Measurement, Computation, and
Statistical Inference, 77 J. ECONOMETRICS 87 (1997).
73.
The concentration index is sometimes applied to bad attributes, e.g., ill health, but the
analysis in this Article generally assumes that the currency for equity is a good attribute—be it income,
utility, or the multiple goods that go into multidimensional inequality or poverty metrics. Thus, I focus
here on the concentration index used to measure social skews in good attributes.
74.
It can range in value from 1 to −1, with lower value indicating less concentration of the
attribute in higher status groups, i.e., greater equity.
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Figure
F
3: Thee Concentrattion Index

Exp
planation: Thiis figure illusstrates the conncentration cuurve for three
grou
ups, G1, G2, and
a G3, ranked
d from lower to higher sociaal status. The
low
w-status group G1 has 25% of the popullation and 5%
% of the total
pop
pulation holding
gs of the attrib
bute; the middlle-status groupp G2 has 55%
of the population and 45% of th
he attribute; thhe high-status ggroup G3 has
20%
% of the populaation and 50% of the attributee. The points ccorresponding
to each
e
group (th
hose labeled G1,
G G2, and G33) show, on thhe x-axis, the
perccentage of the population in
n that group an
and all lower sstatus groups;
and, on the y-axiss, the percentaage of the attrribute in that ggroup and all
low
wer status group
ps. The concen
ntration curve connects thesse points. The
concentration indeex is twice the area between that curve andd the diagonal,
i.e., twice the areaa labeled “CI” in
i this figure.

Thee concentratio
on curve has similarities tto the Lorenzz curve, with the
critical difference th
hat individualls are plottedd along the xx-axis in lightt of
their so
ocial position
n, not their raank in the ppopulation disstribution of the
attributee. For this reason,
r
the concentration index (unlikke an inequaality
metric) satisfies only
y a social-claass-restricted version of thhe Pigou-Dallton
principlle.

5 ADLER 551-607 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

576

1/28/2015 2:55 PM

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 66:3:551

Pigou Dalton Principle: Social Class Restricted
Imagine that one individual has more of some valuable attribute
than a second in distribution d, and that a Pigou-Dalton transfer of
the attribute from the first to the second individual occurs, yielding
dʹ. If the transferee has a worse position in the social hierarchy,
then dʹ should be assigned a lower degree of inequity than d.75
To see why the concentration index satisfies the social-class-restricted
version of the Pigou-Dalton principle, observe that a Pigou-Dalton transfer
of the attribute from a higher to a lower status individual will tend to
“flatten” the concentration curve and bring it close to the diagonal.
Conversely, if dʹ is reached from d via a Pigou-Dalton attribute transfer
from someone with more of the attribute to someone who has less, but the
transferor has the same or lower social status than the transferee, the
concentration index will fail to see dʹ as more equitable than d. In other
words, the concentration index fails to satisfy the more general version of
the Pigou-Dalton principle, requiring any transfer to increase equity
regardless of the social classes of the two individuals. Clearly, if the
transferee and transferor are in the same group, the value of the
concentration index does not change at all. And if we are transferring from
a high attribute, low-status individual to a low attribute, high-status
individual (for example, transferring income from a high-income, minority
person to a low-income Caucasian in a society where race is the marker of
social status), we will be tending to increase the concentration of the
attribute in the higher status group.
E. A Summary
Several themes emerge from this survey of four widely-used families
of equity metrics: inequality metrics, social welfare functions (SWFs),

75.
Let there be G groups with increasing social status, g = 1 to G, and N individuals, i = 1 to N,
each falling in one of the groups. Let yi be the attribute level of individual i, and μ the population mean.
Let fm be the fraction of the population in group m. Define Rg, the so-called “relative rank”
corresponding to group g, as follows: Rg =

fg
2

+



g−1
m=1

f m . For each individual i, let her relative rank

Ri be the rank of the group she belongs to (lower status individuals will have lower such values). It can
be shown that the concentration index is equal to:

N
 2

 N μ  i =1 yi Ri  − 1 .

This formula makes it apparent that a Pigou-Dalton transfer between two individuals will lower the
value of the concentration index iff the transferee has a lower relative rank than the transferor, i.e., iff
the transferee is lower social status.
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poverty metrics, and social-gradient metrics. First, the “currency” for the
Pigou-Dalton principle can vary. Income-inequality metrics and incomepoverty metrics, paradigmatically, satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle with
respect to income (in the case of income-poverty metrics, a restricted
version of the principle). Equity-regarding SWFs satisfy that principle with
respect to utility. Unidimensional inequality metrics applied to some nonincome attribute (e.g., health or happiness) will satisfy the principle with
respect to that attribute. Multi-attribute inequality or poverty metrics will
satisfy the principle (perhaps in a coordinated and/or restricted form) with
respect to transfers in each of the multiple dimensions of individual
attainment being measured.
Second, the Pigou-Dalton principle may be restricted to a subset of
transfers. Poverty metrics will not satisfy the principle with respect to
transfers between non-poor individuals (those above the poverty line). The
concentration index, a paradigmatic social-gradient metric, does not satisfy
the principle except for transfers from higher to lower social status
individuals.
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Table 1: Understanding Equity Metrics76
What is the Currency for the
Pigou-Dalton Principle?

Is the Principle Restricted
in Scope?

Income or any other single attribute
(health, happiness, utility, etc.)

No: A Pigou-Dalton transfer
is approved regardless of
whether the transferee is nonpoor, of high social class, or
responsible for being worse
off than the transferor

Inequality Metrics
Unidimensional

Multidimensional
Simple

Each of a multiplicity of attributes
(a transfer along any dimension
improves equality)

Sophisticated

A transfer along one dimension, if
appropriately coordinated with the
other dimensions, improves
equality

Equity-Regarding SWFs
(most notably the continuous
prioritarian, leximin and rankweighted SWFs)

Utility (a measure of well-being
that is both interpersonally
comparable and respects individual
preferences)

No

Poverty Metrics
Unidimensional

Income or any other single attribute
(health, happiness, utility, etc.)

Multidimensional
Simple

Each of a multiplicity of attributes
(a transfer along any dimension
reduces poverty)

Sophisticated

A transfer along one dimension, if
appropriately coordinated with the
other dimensions, reduces poverty

Yes: Transfers to individuals
who are above the poverty
line (or “non-poor” in a more
complicated sense for
sophisticated
multidimensional metrics) do
not reduce poverty

76.
Note that the table entry for “sophisticated” multidimensional inequality metrics requires
appropriate “coordination” among the transfers. As discussed earlier, the versions of the Pigou-Dalton
principle discussed in the literature on multidimensional inequality build in this “coordination”
requirement in various ways. One such requirement requires equiproportional transfers on all
dimensions; another, that the transferor be better off in all dimensions. See supra text accompanying
notes 44–45.
Similarly, the table entry for “sophisticated” multidimensional poverty metrics has a coordination
requirement. Here, recall that the Alkire-Foster metric (currently the leading multidimensional poverty
metric) incorporates such a requirement because it doesn’t record a dimension-specific transfer as
reducing poverty if the transferee is above a sufficient number of thresholds in the other dimensions.
See sources cited supra note 65.
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Yes: Transfers improve
equity only if the transferee is
in a lower-status social group
than the transferor

These divergent choices with respect to the specification of the PigouDalton principle help to explain the diversity of these metrics—to explain
why their mathematical expression varies, and why they can disagree in
their comparisons of situations as more or less equitable. To be sure,
divergence in the specification of the Pigou-Dalton principle is not the only
important difference between these metrics. (For example, the Gini
coefficient and the coefficient of variation, applied to compare income
distributions, will each satisfy the unrestricted Pigou-Dalton principle with
income as its currency—and yet these metrics are still distinct, namely in
how they rank two income distributions with crossing Lorenz curves.) Still,
I think we make substantial progress in understanding the “topography” of
equity metrics by seeing that the four popular families I have described all
embrace the Pigou-Dalton principle in some form, with disagreement about
what that form should be.77
II. WHY THE PIGOU-DALTON PRINCIPLE? A GENERIC JUSTIFICATION
The Pigou-Dalton principle, evidently, is pervasive in the measurement
of equity. But can this pervasive role be justified? Why, as a normative
matter, should we endorse it?
Here I offer a general argument for the Pigou-Dalton principle—an
argument encapsulated in the form of a “Generic Justification” for the
principle, stating conditions under which the principle seems to have
77.
Two other choices with respect to the specification of the Pigou-Dalton principle, orthogonal
to those just summarized, should be mentioned. First, under conditions of uncertainty regarding
individual attributes, equity metrics may or may not satisfy an “ex ante” Pigou-Dalton principle.
Second, in a multiperiod framework, the Pigou-Dalton principle may be applied to individuals’ lifetime
attribute holdings, or instead to their period-by-period holdings. See ADLER, supra note 28, chs. 5, 6
(discussing these choices in context of equity-regarding SWFs). How equity metrics make these
choices, too, is an important aspect of their structure—one with real consequence for empirical work.
See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Well-Being, Inequality and Time: The Time-Slice Problem and Its Policy
Implications (Inst. for Law and Econ. Research Paper 07–17, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1006871 (documenting empirical differences
between lifetime and sublifetime approaches to equity); supra note 46 (describing debate about whether
inequality of consumption—a rough proxy for lifetime income—has increased to the same degree, in
the U.S., as inequality of lifetime income).
However, for the sake of simplicity, I ignore time and uncertainty in this Article and focus on
exploring the structure of equity metrics as regards (1) “currency,” (2) whether the Pigou-Dalton
principle is “restricted” to adjust for poverty or social class, and (3) individual responsibility, see Part
V.
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considerable normative force.78 The Generic Justification, if accepted,
implies that some Pigou-Dalton transfers, in some currency, are
normatively attractive.
The Pigou-Dalton Principle: A Generic Justification
Assume that (a) one individual (the “transferee”) has a lower level
of some currency C than a second individual (“the transferor”); (b)
the transferee is worse off than the transferor; (c) the transferee is
not responsible for being worse off than the transferor; (d) a PigouDalton transfer in the currency from the transferor to transferee
will produce a well-being improvement for the transferee which is
greater than or equal to the well-being loss for the transferor; (e)
after the transfer, the transferee will not be better off than the
transferor; (f) there are no externalities (no one else’s well-being is
affected). Then the transfer is normatively justified.
Assume that Toni, a transferee, starts off with amount CToni of some
currency, and Gregor, a transferor, starts off with amount CGregor, which is
greater than CToni. Society engineers a Pigou-Dalton transfer from Gregor
to Toni. (Toni increases her holdings of C by the same amount, ∆C, that
Gregor loses; and this amount is less than or equal to half the distance
between their initial holdings of C, so that Toni ends up at CToni + ∆C,
which is less than or equal to CGregor − ∆C.) Add now the critical facts about
well-being and responsibility, built into the Generic Justification. CToni is
not merely a smaller amount of C than CGregor. In addition, Toni gains at
least as much from the transfer, in well-being terms, as Gregor loses.
Moreover, before the transfer, Toni is at a lower well-being level than
Gregor and, even afterwards, is at a lower (or at least not a higher) level. In
such a case, doesn’t Toni have a stronger normative claim in favor of the
transfer, than Gregor’s normative claim in opposition?
Plausibly, the strength of an individual’s normative claim for or against
some social policy is a function, first, of the impact of the policy upon her
(the magnitude of her well-being difference pre- and post-policy); and,
second, her well-being level (whether she is better or worse off than others
in her society).79 Ceteris paribus, individuals more substantially affected by
a given policy have stronger claims regarding it; and, ceteris paribus,
worse-off individuals who stand to be affected by a given policy have
stronger claims regarding it. But in the case at hand each of these two
78.
Cf. ADLER, supra note 28, at 307–51 (defending Pigou-Dalton principle for case where C is
well-being).
79.
See id. at 339–40; THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY (1995); THOMAS NAGEL,
Equality, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 106 (1979).
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factors weighs in favor of Toni. Were Toni to benefit from the transfer by
less than Gregor loses, the first factor would point to Gregor; and were she
to start and/or finish better off than him, the second might. But (by
hypothesis) neither is true here.
To be sure, if Toni were (in some sense) at fault for being at a lower
pre-transfer level of C than Gregor, that might deflate her normative claim
to the transfer. And if the transfer harmed other individuals, then their
claims in opposition—together with Gregor’s—might defeat Toni’s claim
in favor. But the Generic Justification does not apply in such cases; it
purports to justify a Pigou-Dalton transfer in some currency only absent
externalities, and absent transferee responsibility for being comparatively
worse off.
The Generic Justification presumes that well-being levels and
differences are interpersonally comparable, at least to some extent. This is
not to say that well-being levels and differences are universally
comparable, merely (and much less controversially) that there are some
cases in which one individual is genuinely better off than or equally well
off as a second, and some cases in which an individual is more affected by
or equally affected by a choice as compared to a second—as opposed to
these levels or changes being non-comparable.80
One objection to the Generic Justification has to do with Pigou-Dalton
transfers, in some currency C, that increase the gap between the transferee
and individuals with an even lower level of C. Assume that there are three
individuals in the population, Able, Baker and Charlie. Able is at level 10,
with much less C than Baker, at 80, and Charlie, at 100. Ten units of C are
transferred from Charlie to Baker. So we have moved from the distribution
(10, 80, 100) to the distribution (10, 90, 90). This is indeed a Pigou-Dalton
transfer in C—but it leaves Able “stranded” at the bottom of the
distribution, even further below the next best off, Baker, than Able was
before the transfer. Isn’t it intuitively plausible that the distribution (10, 80,
100) is actually more equitable than the distribution (10, 90, 90)?81
A person’s position in the population distribution of some attribute
might itself affect her well-being. For example, someone’s welfare might
be (in part) a function of her income relative to those around her—perhaps
because low relative income tends to cause unhappiness. By virtue of such
“positional” effects, the distribution (10, 90, 90) might be worse for Able
than the distribution (10, 80, 100).82 But, if so, the Generic Justification
80.
81.

See ADLER, supra note 28, at 185–92.
See, e.g., Ernesto Savaglio, Inequality as Differences: A Simple Characterization, 61 RES. IN
ECON. 31, 32 (2007); Buhong Zheng, Utility-Gap Dominances and Inequality Orderings, 28 SOC.
CHOICE & WELFARE 255, 256 (2007).
82.
The revisionary inequality metrics mentioned immediately below, which fail to respect the
Pigou-Dalton principle, see infra note 83, are regularly justified with reference to the feelings of
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does not apply. It claims that a Pigou-Dalton transfer in C is justified on the
condition that there are no externalities. Positional effects, or other kinds of
effects on the well-being of third parties, certainly could override the
normative case for a transfer.
Thus, in considering the plausibility of the Generic Justification, we
should imagine that Able is equally well off with (10, 80, 100) and (10, 90,
90). If so, isn’t (10, 90, 90) a normative improvement over (10, 80, 100)?
Able is unaffected by the choice. Since he is unaffected, why should it
matter that he is at 10 rather than, say, 150? Presumably the distribution
(150, 90, 90) is better than the distribution (150, 80, 100)—on the condition
that the shrinking of the gap between Baker and Charlie has no external
impact on the well-being of Able. But, if so, why reach a different verdict
about the comparison of (10, 90, 90) and (10, 80, 100), if that condition still
holds true?
The critic of the Generic Justification might respond that (10, 80, 100)
is a more equal distribution than (10, 90, 90), while (150, 90, 90) is a more
equal distribution than (150, 80, 100). This change in the degree of
inequality makes (10, 90, 90) worse than (10, 80, 100) even if Able is
genuinely unaffected by the transfer from Charlie to Baker.
But what is the criterion for measuring equality which says that (10, 90,
90) is less equal than (10, 80, 100)? The first distribution Lorenz-dominates
the second, and thus every standard inequality metric will say that it is
more equal.
To be sure, the critic might try to construct a non-standard inequality
metric which says that (10, 80, 100) is more equal than (10, 90, 90) while
(150, 90, 90) is more equal than (150, 80, 100).83 But any such metric will
be contestable. The Lorenz criterion has real intuitive force (which of
course explains why the criterion is the linchpin for traditional inequality
metrics). If one distribution of some attribute Lorenz-dominates a second,
then—in a straightforward and intuitive way—it is closer to perfect
equality.
In short, a strong case can be presented for accepting the Generic
Justification. Like most normative arguments, this case is not irresistible.
But it shows why some version of the Pigou-Dalton principle is very
plausible.

resentment and deprivation that worse-off persons have in virtue of their relative position. See
CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, at 85; Brice Magdalou & Patrick Moyes, Deprivation, Welfare, and
Inequality, 32 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 253, 254 (2009).
83.
For discussion of inequality metrics that fail to respect the standard Pigou-Dalton principle,
see CHAKRAVARTY, supra note 29, ch. 3; Udo Ebert, Taking Empirical Studies Seriously: The Principle
of Concentration and the Measurement of Welfare and Inequality, 32 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 555
(2009); Magdalou & Moyes, supra note 82; Savaglio, supra note 81.
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The Generic Justification, in turn, is a tool that we can use to evaluate
different equity metrics. We can now ask: do the transfers approved by that
metric approximate the conditions identified by the Generic Justification?
First, does the metric employ an appropriate currency (given that
Justification)? Second, insofar as it restricts the transfers (as do poverty and
social-gradient metrics), is that appropriate? It is to these questions that we
now turn.
III. WHAT IS THE BEST CURRENCY FOR THE PIGOU-DALTON PRINCIPLE?
What is the best currency for the Pigou-Dalton principle? This Part
grapples with the question and shows why it is a contestable one—at least
at present, absent a consensus about how to construct an interpersonally
comparable84 measure of well-being.
Inequality and poverty metrics traditionally focus on the distribution of
income, and, paradigmatically, satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle (at least a
restricted version thereof) in the space of income.85 While income has
attractive features as a currency for the Pigou-Dalton, it also possesses
major deficits. The Generic Justification provides an analytic lens that
brings the deficits of an income currency into clear view. But it remains
disputable how to specify an alternative currency that will redress all of
these imperfections.
The advantage of an income currency is that income is both readily
measurable and widely useful in improving well-being (given the existence
of markets)—so that income and well-being levels correlate. What are its
disadvantages? First, because of positional effects, a Pigou-Dalton transfer
in income may lower the well-being of third parties and thus, on balance,
be inequitable. Second, quite apart from positional effects, a Pigou-Dalton
transfer in income may be inequitable if the transferee has a higher level
than the transferor of some non-economic good (health, environmental
quality, a happy disposition, social life, etc.)—sufficiently so that the
transfer is regressive in terms of well-being, making a better-off (if lower
income) transferee yet better off, and a worse-off (if higher income)
transferor yet worse off. The point here is that income and well-being
levels are only imperfectly correlated. Third, a pure transfer in income may
be a “leaky” transfer in well-being: the transferee may gain less, in well-

84.
A plausible measure of well-being may have some “gaps” with respect to interpersonal
comparisons of well-being levels and differences, but it should not wholly eschew such comparisons, or
make them so rarely as to contradict our intuitions about hypothetical or real-world cases in which
interpersonal comparisons seem to be possible. See supra text accompanying note 80.
85.
I say “paradigmatically” because there are some income poverty metrics (albeit disapproved
in the theoretical literature) that fail to satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle even restricted to transfers
between poor individuals. See supra text accompanying notes 60–61.
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being terms, than the transferor loses. This is possible (although
empirically unlikely) even if both individuals are identical in non-income
attributes. It is possible (and empirically more plausible) where their nonincome attributes differ.86
The three observations in the previous paragraph all point to different
ways in which a Pigou-Dalton transfer in income might fail to meet the
conditions identified by the Generic Justification. A different observation is
this: income-poverty and income-equality metrics fail to satisfy the PigouDalton principle with respect to non-income currencies. A Pigou-Dalton
transfer in health, for example, is not registered by such metrics (unless it
happens to change incomes). But a Pigou-Dalton transfer in health, without
any impact on income, obviously could be a net positive for equity.
The deficits of using income (or some other economic resource) as the
“currency” for the Pigou-Dalton principle are, clearly, not resolved by
using another, single, currency—if that attribute is simply one aspect of
well-being, rather than an inclusive measure of well-being. For example,
measuring equity by applying a unidimensional inequality or poverty
metric to the distribution of longevity is vulnerable to all the criticisms just
leveled against income-based inequality and poverty metrics.
Multidimensional inequality and poverty metrics, recall, have multiple
currencies for the Pigou-Dalton principle. Such measures quantify equity as
a function of individual attainment on a multiplicity of well-being relevant
dimensions. Interest in them has been fueled by the (correctly) perceived
deficits of the traditional, income-based approach to measuring poverty and
inequality.87 Critiques of income as the distribuendum for equity are
standard fare in the “multidimensional” literature.88
However, the multidimensional approach is hardly a panacea.
Consider, first, dimension-by-dimension metrics. This methodology applies
an inequality or poverty metric to each dimension and then calculates
multidimensional inequality or poverty as the average (or some similar
function) of the dimensional values.89 Thus, a Pigou-Dalton transfer in any
one of the dimensions will reduce multidimensional inequality (and
multidimensional poverty, depending on where the dimension-specific
poverty lines are set).
86.
A further objection to applying the Pigou-Dalton principle to income (or any other single
attribute which is only one aspect of well-being) is that this can conflict with the Pareto principle. See
ADLER, supra note 28, at 114–17; see also infra text accompanying notes 93–94 (discussing conflicts
between multidimensional Pigou-Dalton principle and Pareto principle).
87.
See A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon, The Comparison of Multi-Dimensioned Distributions
of Economic Status, 49 REV. ECON. STUD. 183, 183–85 (1982).
88.
See, e.g., id.; Bourguignon & Chakravarty, supra note 62, at 25–27; Erik Thorbecke, Issues
Related to the Concept of Multidimensional Poverty, in THE MANY DIMENSIONS OF POVERTY, supra
note 62, at 3–5; Tsui, supra note 62, at 71–72.
89.
See supra text accompanying note 41.
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But a Pigou-Dalton transfer in any single dimension, taken alone, may
be regressive in terms of well-being. To illustrate, assume that there are
five dimensions taken account of by the metric, and a Pigou-Dalton transfer
in the first dimension occurs. Before the transfer, the transferee has bundle
(a, b, c, d, e), while the transferor has bundle (a*, b*, c*, d*, e*). The
transferor’s holdings of the first attribute, a*, are greater than the
transferee’s, a. After the transfer, the bundles become (a + ∆a , b , c , d, e)
and (a* − ∆a, b*, c*, d*, e*). Since b, c, d, and e may well be greater than,
respectively, b*, c*, d*, and e*, the transfer on the first dimension may
have the perverse effect of making a better-off person yet better off.
The proponent of the dimension-by-dimension approach might resist
this attack by denying the comparability of well-being levels and
differences or the relevance of interpersonal well-being comparisons to
equity—in effect, rejecting the Generic Justification and offering some
alternative, non-welfarist “story” in favor of the Pigou-Dalton principle.90
Even so, the dimension-by-dimension approach is hardly impeccable. A
Pigou-Dalton transfer on any one dimension might, on balance, be unfair to
the transferor if the transferee has a higher level on other dimension(s).91
Even the non-welfarist should be able to see the force of this objection to
the approach.
“Sophisticated” multidimensional inequality or poverty metrics do not
merely average dimension-specific measures. They may therefore have the
feature of preferring a transfer in one dimension only if appropriately
coordinated with transfers in other dimensions. For example, a
“sophisticated” metric might only see a transfer as increasing equity if the
transferor is better off than the transferee in all dimensions.92 This
stipulation would allow the “sophisticated” approach to avoid the
objections to the dimension-by-dimension approach offered in the previous
two paragraphs.
However, other objections remain. Perhaps the most serious one is that
multidimensional inequality and poverty metrics—sophisticated as well as
dimension-by-dimension—can come into conflict with the Pareto
principle.93 Let d and dʹ be two multidimensional distributions. The Pareto

90.
Although a strong case can be made that well-being (adjusted for responsibility) is the
appropriate currency for assessments of fair distribution, this remains controversial. See generally
Richard Arneson, Welfare Should be the Currency for Justice, 30 CAN. J. PHIL. 497 (2000).
91.
See Daniel M. Hausman, What’s Wrong with Health Inequalities?, 15 J. POL. PHILOSOPHY 46
(2006).
92.
See Lasso de la Vega, supra note 45.
93.
On conflicts between the Pigou-Dalton and Pareto principles in the multidimensional context,
see Marc Fleurbaey, Social Welfare, Priority to the Worst-Off and the Dimensions of Individual WellBeing, in INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note 38, at 225, 238–342; Marc Fleurbaey
& Alain Trannoy, The Impossibility of a Paretian Egalitarian, 21 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 243
(2003).
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principle says: (1) If everyone is indifferent between d and dʹ, the two
distributions are equally good; and (2) if everyone either prefers dʹ to d or
is indifferent, and at least one individual prefers dʹ to d, then dʹ is better.
One version of a “coordinated” multidimensional Pigou-Dalton principle
says that if dʹ is reached from d via a Pigou-Dalton transfer on any single
dimension, and the transferor starts off with higher levels on all
dimensions, then dʹ is better than d.94
It turns out that these two principles are logically inconsistent. It is
impossible to come up with an integrated procedure for ranking
distributions that satisfies both principles—as shown by the example in
Table 2 immediately below.
Table 2: Multidimensional Pigou-Dalton versus Pareto
Distribution d
A
B

Distribution d*
A
B

Distribution d**
A
B

Distribution d***
A
B

Individual 1

15

1

16

2

3

17

4

18

Individual 2

18

4

17

3

2

16

1

15

Explanation: The A and B columns show the individuals’ levels of each
attribute in distributions d, d*, d**, and d***. Note that, in distribution d,
Individual 2 has more of each attribute than Individual 1, and d* is
reached from d by a Pigou-Dalton transfer in both attributes. Similarly,
Individual 1 has more of each attribute in distribution d***, and
distribution d** is reached by a Pigou-Dalton transfer in both attributes.
But imagine that the individuals’ preferences are such that: first, they are
each indifferent between their bundles in d and their bundles in d**; and,
second, they are each indifferent between their bundles in d* and their
bundles in d***.
With these preferences, it is impossible to rank the distributions in a
manner that respects both the Pareto principle and the Pigou-Dalton
A different objection to the multidimensional approach is that one or more dimension-specific transfers
may yield a leaky rather than pure transfer in well-being (thus departing from the conditions identified
by the Generic Justification), where one individual gains less in well-being than a second loses. Note
that this is true even for a sophisticated approach which requires the transferor to be better off in all
dimensions.
94.
Not only is this principle satisfied by some “sophisticated” multidimensional inequality
metrics; note that it is also satisfied by the dimension-by-dimension approach, which prefers a PigouDalton transfer in any dimension regardless of the comparative position of transferee and transferor on
other dimensions.
What about the other standard multidimensional Pigou-Dalton principle—preferring an
equiproportional transfer in all dimensions? ADLER, supra note 28, at 117–18, illustrates how this
principle can conflict with the Pareto principle.
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principle (either the dimension-by-dimension version, or the version
limited to transfers where the transferor has more of each attribute). The
Pareto principle requires that d is equally good as d**, and that d* is
equally good as d***. The Pigou-Dalton principle requires that d* is
better than d and that d** is better than d***. These can’t both be true.

The Pareto principle has strong normative appeal. It lies at the core of
welfare economics (as readers surely know), just as the Pigou-Dalton
principle is foundational to equity measurement. It would be nice to show
that these two grand normative projects are compatible: that we can
endorse Pigou-Dalton transfers (in an appropriate currency), without
inevitably running afoul of the Pareto principle. Unfortunately, the
multidimensional “currency” for Pigou-Dalton does not enable such happy
reconciliation.
What about using an inclusive measure of individual well-being as the
currency for Pigou-Dalton? For any bundle of attributes someone might
possess (including both economic resources, such as income, and any noneconomic attributes the equity researcher might wish to include), an
inclusive measure of individual well-being assigns that bundle a single
number quantifying its well-being value, integrating information about all
the attributes. Equity is then measured as a function of the distribution of
these well-being values.
As discussed above, equity-regarding social welfare functions (SWFs)
follow this strategy. In particular, they employ utility as an inclusive wellbeing indicator. The SWF approach assumes that “utility” has the following
features: First, utility covaries with preferences, meaning that any given
individual has greater utility in one outcome as compared to a second iff95
she prefers the first outcome to the second. Second, utility mirrors
interpersonal comparisons of well-being levels and differences. One
person’s utility is greater than a second’s iff the first person is better off
than the second (and similarly for well-being differences).96
Assume that a utility indicator with these features can be constructed.
Then we can readily achieve the desired integration of efficiency and
equity—of the Pareto principle and the Pigou-Dalton principle. Given any
set of possible distributions—distributions of bundles of both economic and
non-economic attributes among a population—our utility measure will
translate each distribution into a list of individual utilities. An equity-

95.
“Iff” means “if and only if.”
96.
See ADLER, supra note 28, at 61–88. On a broader view, “utility” is a measure of well-being
(even a non-preference-based account of well-being). More traditionally, economists (including those in
the SWF tradition) use “utility” as a measure of preferences—and because I believe a strong case can be
made for analyzing well-being in terms of preferences (perhaps appropriately “laundered” preferences),
I stick to that usage here. See id. ch. 3.
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regarding SWF will rank the lists and corresponding distributions in a
logically coherent (transitive) fashion. Moreover, if two distributions are
such that some individuals have more utility in the first, and no one has less
utility in the first, any equity-regarding SWF will rank the first distribution
higher.97 This assures consistency with the Pareto principle (on the
assumption that we have a measure of utility that covaries with
preferences). Finally, if one distribution is reached from a second by a
Pigou-Dalton transfer in utility, an equity-regarding SWF will rank the first
distribution higher. Thus (on the assumption that utility mirrors
interpersonal comparisons of well-being levels and differences) a PigouDalton transfer in utility will always meet the conditions set forth by the
Generic Justification.98
However, producing a measure of utility with the desired features is not
straightforward. The difficulty arises because of the heterogeneity of
preferences. Consider, first, the case in which everyone has the same
preferences, including risk preferences: the same ranking of attribute
bundles and the same ranking of lotteries over bundles. Then there will be a
function, u, the mathematical expectation of which represents these
common preferences. Clearly, such a u does secure consistency with the
Pareto principle. Moreover, if B is a bundle held by Jim, and B* held by
Sue, u(B) > u(B*) means that both individuals (and everyone else) prefer
the first bundle to the second—so it seems very plausible that Jim with B
does indeed have a higher level of well-being than Sue with B*. Finally, u
in the case of common preferences is at least a plausible interpersonally
comparable measure of well-being differences.
But where preferences are heterogeneous, it less clear how to arrive at
utility.99 Where Jim, Sue, Randy, etc., rank bundles differently, there is a
function uJim that represents Jim’s preferences; a different function, uSue,
that represents Sue’s; yet a different function, uRandy, that represents
Randy’s; and so forth. If we pick Jim’s function as our measure of utility
(say), and use that as the input to our SWF, the Pareto principle may be
violated, since uJim does not track Sue’s preferences or Randy’s—and, in
any event, it seems arbitrarily “dictatorial” to give priority to one person’s
preferences in assigning a well-being value to attribute bundles for the
purposes of social decision making.
Thus, in the case of heterogeneous preferences, in order to assign a
“utility” number to attribute bundles—where these numbers will, in turn,
serve as the input for an equity-regarding SWF or some other equity

97.
Throughout the Article, I focus on standard, “Paretian” SWF that have the monotonicity
feature just described. See ADLER, supra note 28, at 70-71, 307-08.
98.
See id. at 119–24, 339–51.
99.
See id. at 199–200, 279–84.
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metric—we will somehow need to take account of the plurality of
individual functions representing each individual’s preferences over the
bundles. Although there are intelligible proposals for how to do this, these
proposals have arguable flaws or lacunae.100 The SWF literature often tends
to overlook the problem of measuring utility in the case of heterogeneous
preferences, and certainly has not arrived at a plausible, consensus solution
to that problem.101
The concept of “equivalent” income is one proposal for handling
heterogeneous preferences in the construction of an inclusive measure of
individual well-being—a proposal recently much discussed by economic
theorists.102 The idea here is to normalize someone’s income so that it
reflects her level of non-income attributes. More precisely, some “reference
bundle” of non-income attributes is specified. The equivalent income of a
given individual is such that she is indifferent between that amount and the
reference bundle of non-income attributes, as compared to her actual
income and actual non-income attributes.103 “Equivalent income” can then
function as the input to an inequality or poverty metric, SWF, or socialgradient metric.
“Equivalent income” has substantial attractions as a currency for the
Pigou-Dalton principle. Unlike actual income, it reflects non-income
attributes. And there is no logical inconsistency between requiring the
ranking of distributions to satisfy both the Pareto principle and the PigouDalton principle in terms of equivalent income.104 But this proposed
currency is hardly perfect. The Pigou-Dalton principle framed in terms of

100.
In my own work, I have developed the concept of “extended preferences” as a basis for
interpersonal comparisons. A given “spectator” or “deliberator” develops a well-being ranking of
bundles of attributes (I also use the term “history”), and in so doing may choose to respect the
preferences of the individuals (“subjects”) who possess the attributes. I use the term “extended
preferences” to refer to such a ranking. Different spectators may have different extended preferences,
and one way to accommodate such diversity is to pool them. See id. at 201–36; Matthew Adler,
Extended Preferences, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY (Matthew D.
Adler & Marc Fleurbaey eds., forthcoming 2015); Matthew Adler, Extended Preferences and
Interpersonal Comparisons: A New Account, 30 ECON. AND PHIL. 123 (2014).
An objection to the pooling of extended preferences is that this may yield too much incomparability
with respect to well-being levels and differences. See Alex Voorhoeve, Book Review, 42 SOC. CHOICE
& WELFARE 245 (2014). Even leaving aside pooling, a lacuna in my extended-preferences framework is
the absence of a specific theory for scaling the von Neumann-Morgenstern functions representing the
preferences of subjects with different tastes. The theory allows for various such scalings, but gives no
definitive recommendations about which to choose. See Adler, Extended Preferences. Further
refinement of the framework will, I hope, close this gap.
101.
See ROBIN BOADWAY, FROM OPTIMAL TAX THEORY TO TAX POLICY 199–217 (2012).
102.
See generally MARC FLEURBAEY & DIDIER BLANCHET, BEYOND GDP: MEASURING
WELFARE AND ASSESSING SUSTAINABILITY ch. 4 (2013); Marc Fleurbaey, Equivalent Income, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY (Matthew D. Adler and Marc Fleurbaey
eds., forthcoming 2015).
103.
See Fleurbaey, supra note 102.
104.
See ADLER, supra note 28, at 124–30.
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equivalent income may fail to prefer a policy that meets the Generic
Justification, and vice versa.105
“Happiness” is yet another possible currency—as in recent empirical
work that quantifies the inequality of happiness, based on responses to
happiness surveys.106 On one view, someone’s happiness is simply one
dimension of her well-being. More ambitiously, a response to an
appropriately constructed happiness survey might be seen as an inclusive
measure: someone who expresses a higher happiness number is, all things
considered, better off. 107
The viability of happiness as an inclusive measure is a complex
question, which I have elsewhere discussed at length.108 In brief, the
proponent of this approach faces a dilemma. (1) Someone’s answer to a
happiness question might be seen as an indicator of the quality of her
experiences: whether she feels pain, avoids pleasure, has a sense of
satisfaction about what she does, etc. But such an indicator can only be a
reflection of someone’s all-things-considered well-being if well-being is
mentalistic: if someone’s experiences are the only intrinsic source of wellbeing. And that is a highly controversial view about well-being. (2)
Alternatively, someone’s answer to a happiness survey might be taken as
an indicator of how well her preferences are satisfied. In short, it indicates
her “utility.” But, even in the case where individuals have identical
preferences (so that the construction of a utility metric is relatively
straightforward), it need not be true that a higher happiness score signals
higher utility, or that differences in happiness scores mirror differences in

105.
To see this in a simple way, imagine that in d all individuals actually have the reference
bundle of non-income attributes. If well-being is an increasing, concave function of income with nonincome attributes fixed at the reference bundle, then there will be cases where dʹ is produced from d via
a leaky transfer of income from a higher- to a lower-income individual, thus is not a Pigou-Dalton
transfer in equivalent income, but is a Pigou-Dalton transfer in well-being. Conversely, if well-being is
an increasing, convex function of income with non-income attributes fixed at the reference bundle, then
there will be cases where dʹ is produced from d via a Pigou-Dalton transfer in equivalent income but is
not a Pigou-Dalton transfer in well-being.
The proponent of equivalent-income might respond that well-being is linear in income at the reference
bundle of non-income attributes. However, it is hard to see why this would be true (for any choice of
reference bundle). It is a truism about well-being that income has non-constant (e.g., diminishing)
marginal utility.
A second and more subtle difficulty with using equivalent income as the currency for the Pigou-Dalton
principle is that it fails to differentiate between individuals with the same ordinal preferences but
different risk preferences. See Adler, Extended Preferences, supra note 100.
106.
See Clark et al., supra note 15; Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 15, at S33; Ruut
Veenhoven & Wim Kalmijn, Inequality-Adjusted Happiness in Nations, 6 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 421
(2005). Happiness has also been used as the currency for poverty measurement. See G.G. Kingdon & J.
Knight, Subjective Well-Being Poverty vs. Income Poverty and Capabilities Poverty, 42 J. DEV. STUD.
1199 (2006).
107.
See Matthew D. Adler, Happiness Surveys and Public Policy: What’s the Use? 62 DUKE
L.J. 1509 (2013)
108.
See id.
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utility.109 Nor is it clear that using happiness scores is an attractive solution
to the much harder problem of constructing a utility metric when
individuals have heterogeneous preferences.
In summary, from a welfarist perspective, the ideal currency for the
Pigou-Dalton principle would be an inclusive measure of well-being. More
specifically—for anyone who endorses a preference-based view of wellbeing and, therewith, the Pareto principle—the ideal currency would be an
interpersonally comparable measure of individual utility. But it remains
controversial how to construct such utilities once preference heterogeneity
enters the picture. Reciprocally, currencies other than an inclusive wellbeing measure have clear imperfections. At least some such imperfections,
summarized in Table 3 below, characterize not only traditional income and
poverty metrics but also metrics that employ another single currency as
well as multidimensional metrics, a newer tool. However, the continuing
presence of equity metrics with these sorts of currencies is understandable
and, to some extent, justified as a “second-best” matter, absent a clearly
viable inclusive well-being measure.

109.
The problem is that different individuals may use different utility scales to express the
common preferences, or give a response to a happiness question that expresses their feelings rather than
“utility” in the sense of preference-satisfaction. See id.
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Table 3: The Pros and Cons of Different “Currencies” for the PigouDalton Principle
Transferee might be
better off (even
though at lower level
of currency)?

Transfer might be
“leaky” in terms of
well-being (wellbeing increase of
transferee less than
loss of transferor)?

Potential
conflict with
Pareto
principle?

Income

Yes

Yes

Yes

Any other single
dimension of
individual well-being
(e.g., health)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

“Sophisticated”
approach (only
coordinated transfers
improve equity)

No* (if coordination
requirement
appropriately
specified)

Yes

Yes

Equivalent Income

No*

Yes* (if unlikely)

No

Utility

No

No

No

Multiple Dimensions
Simple approach (a
transfer along any
dimension improves
equity)

Explanation: The “No” entries marked by an asterisk assume that wellbeing is increasing in each attribute (both income and the other attributes).
It is possible but unlikely that a Pigou-Dalton transfer in equivalent
income will be leaky in well-being, for reasons discussed in note 105
above.

IV. SHOULD THE PIGOU-DALTON PRINCIPLE BE “RESTRICTED”? HEREIN
OF POVERTY AND SOCIAL-GRADIENT METRICS
Traditional inequality metrics and equity-regarding SWFs illustrate the
Pigou-Dalton principle in its simplest, unrestricted form. The Gini
coefficient, applied to the distribution of income, is such that a PigouDalton transfer in income from anyone at a higher level of income, to
anyone at a lower level, reduces the degree of inequality. Similarly, equityregarding SWFs prefer a Pigou-Dalton transfer in utility from anyone at a
higher level of utility, to anyone at a lower level.
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A “restricted” version of the Pigou-Dalton principle, in some currency,
prefers only a subset of transfers in that currency. In this Part, I normatively
evaluate the two types of restrictions embodied by equity metrics that are
currently in wide use: a restriction defined by the transferee’s and
transferor’s location relative to the poverty line (embodied by poverty
metrics), and a restriction defined by their social class (embodied by socialgradient metrics).
A. Poverty Metrics
As we saw in Part I, there are different ways in which the poverty line
might function to restrict the scope of the Pigou-Dalton principle. For
example, an income poverty metric might prefer every Pigou-Dalton
transfer in income from a poor person (someone who lies below the
income-poverty line) to someone even poorer, but not necessarily every
Pigou-Dalton transfer in income from a non-poor person to a poor person.
By contrast, the widely favored “FGT” income-poverty metric is fairly
expansive in its sensitivity to transfers. If the FGT parameter α is above 1,
any Pigou-Dalton transfer in which the transferee is poor reduces the
measured degree of poverty.110
However, every income-poverty metric (including the FGT metric and
every other) is insensitive to transfers between non-poor individuals.
Income-poverty metrics simply do not take account of the income
distribution above the poverty line; this is a universal, constitutive feature
of such metrics. Similarly, every multidimensional poverty metric is such
that a transfer (in one or more dimensions) between two individuals who
are decisively non-poor—who have above-thresholds attainments in all
dimensions—will have no effect on the measured degree of poverty.
In short, all poverty metrics are insensitive (at least) to transfers
between the non-poor. Why would this restriction be justified?
One argument for the restriction is based upon a normative view,
“sufficientism,” defended by the contemporary moral philosopher Roger
Crisp.111 “Sufficientists” contend that a Pigou-Dalton transfer in well-being
is a matter of normative indifference—not a normative improvement—if
the transferee and transferor are both sufficiently well-off. Crisp supports
this contention by describing a hypothetical case—the “Beverly Hills”
case—in which society has to choose between giving fine wine to rich
individuals or to super-rich individuals, where the welfare benefit of
drinking the wine is the same for both types. He argues that it makes no
difference who gets the wine.
110.
111.

See supra text accompanying notes 56–59.
Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and Compassion, 113 ETHICS 745 (2003).
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It seems somewhat absurd to think that the Rich should be given
priority over the Super-rich . . . . [W]hat the Beverly Hills case
brings out is that, once recipients are at a certain level, any
prioritarian concern for them disappears entirely. This implies that
any version of the priority view must fail: when people reach a
certain level, even if they are worse off than others, benefiting
them does not, in itself, matter more. And this seems to me to be
true even if, in a Beverly Hills case, the utilities are equal. That is,
even if the benefits to each of the Rich and the Super-rich are
identical and their numbers are the same, there still seems to me
nothing to be said for giving priority to the “worse off.” At this
level, only [the sum total of] utilities matter, so there would be
nothing to choose between the two distributions.112
The Beverly Hills case seems to provide intuitive support for
sufficientism. However, such intuitions may weaken if we think carefully
about the case and keep in mind that (as Crisp constructs the case) having
fine wine is supposed to improve the well-being of the rich and super-rich,
rather than being a frivolous gesture that make no welfare difference at
all.113
Assume that Richie is indeed very well-off but that Super-Richie is yet
better off. It’s not merely that Super-Richie’s life is piled up with more
material luxuries than Richie’s. (After all, someone could have more
material luxuries without being better off.) Rather, Super-Richie’s life is
really better for well-being than Richie’s. Moreover, Super-Richie (and, a
fortiori, Richie) is not yet at the maximum of human well-being.
As it turns out, Society has some indivisible item which would improve
either Richie’s life or Super-Richie’s—indeed, by the same amount—and
which no one else cares about. Society could just discard the item, but
anyone who thinks Society should do that will run headlong into the Pareto
principle. Now, if both Richie and Super-Richie were badly off, the choice
between them would not be a matter of indifference (as Crisp would
concede). Richie would be the appropriate recipient. Why would that be the
case? Plausibly, for the reason I sketched earlier, arguing for the Generic
Justification: Richie’s claim to the item (understood as a function both of
Richie’s well-being level, and of the difference the item would make to

112.
Id. at 755. Although Crisp focuses specifically here on prioritarianism, his critique is really a
broader critique of any scheme for ranking outcomes (formalized by some type of “equity-regarding”
SWF) that satisfies the Pigou-Dalton principle in the currency of well-being without regard to whether
the transferee is above some well-being threshold.
113.
For critiques of sufficientism, see Adler, supra note 28, at 345–51; Paula Casal, Why
Sufficiency Is Not Enough, 117 ETHICS 296 (2007); Larry Temkin, Egalitarianism Defended, 113
ETHICS 764 (2003).
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him) would be stronger than Super-Richie’s (similarly understood). Why,
now, does Richie’s comparatively stronger claim evaporate if both he and
Super-Richie are above some well-being threshold? If the Pareto principle
doesn’t disappear above a threshold, why does the Pigou-Dalton principle?
Relatedly, it is unclear how the sufficientist means to specify the
limitation on the scope of the Pigou-Dalton principle. Supposedly, a PigouDalton transfer, in well-being, to someone whose well-being level is above
some threshold, is a matter of normative indifference—not an improvement
in equity. But where is that normative threshold?
Sufficientism offers one—controversial—justification for the
restriction in scope of the Pigou-Dalton principle embodied by poverty
metrics. The traditional argument for poverty lines is different. This
argument sees the poverty line with respect to some individual attribute (be
it income, or some non-income attribute) as the threshold for satisfying
minimum human needs (whether defined in absolute terms, for example as
what someone needs for physical survival, or in relative terms, as what
someone needs to be accorded basic respect in her society).114 In effect, the
poverty line marks a “discontinuity” in the relation between that attribute
and an individual’s well-being.115 Below a certain level of income,
someone’s life is qualitatively worse: she becomes socially excluded
because of her inability to buy the material goods that society values, may
lack money to purchase sufficient food, etc. Similarly, someone who lacks
reliable shelter, or minimal education, or companionship, is living a
categorically different (and worse) kind of life than someone whose basic
needs are satisfied.
This line of analysis helps to justify poverty metrics as one component
of an overall assessment of equity, if we lack a workable inclusive measure
of well-being (in particular, an interpersonally comparable utility
indicator). Absent such a measure, it seems quite plausible to bifurcate the
assessment of equity. First, what progress is society making in reducing the
very grave inequity that occurs when some individuals lack minimally
decent lives? Second, how inequitable is the distribution of economic and
non-economic resources more generally—including, now, inequities
between those who have enough in all dimensions to be non-poor, and
others yet better off? The first step in this bifurcated analysis would involve
a poverty metric. It would mean focusing on the number and attainment of
individuals who have below-threshold incomes or non-income attainments,
114.
See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Issues in the Measurement of Poverty, 81 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON.
285, 288–89 (1979).
115.
Sufficientism sees a discontinuity within moral assessment itself; there is some level of wellbeing at which the Pigou-Dalton principle is no longer morally compelling. By contrast, the view now
under discussion sees a discontinuity in the determination of individual well-being—in how attributes
produce well-being at the level of each individual.
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and ignoring Pigou-Dalton transfers among non-poor individuals—for
purposes of this first step (not the second).
It is less clear why such bifurcated assessment would be warranted
given a workable, interpersonally comparable utility function.116 Such an
indicator (to be fully adequate) would need somehow to reflect, in its
mathematical structure,117 the discontinuity with respect to well-being that
occurs around a poverty line. Utility (or the rate of increase of utility)
would “jump” at that point. An equity-regarding SWF could then be
applied to the distribution of utility in a single, unified assessment of
equity—with the Pigou-Dalton principle taking utility (unrestrictedly) as its
currency, and with no need for a poverty metric at all.
But, as explained in Part III, constructing an inclusive measure of wellbeing continues to pose challenges. Absent such a measure, the use of
poverty metrics as one component of equity analysis—and the attendant
insensitivity of this component to Pigou-Dalton transfers among nonpoor—has substantial appeal.
B. Social-Gradient Metrics
Social-gradient metrics look at the comparative attainment of
individuals with different social statuses—using some proxy for status.118
The concentration index is a dominant such metric, which often is
employed to quantify social-status skews in health, but in principle can be
used to quantify skews in any currency C. With some C as its input, the
concentration index satisfies the Pigou-Dalton principle with respect to C
where the transferor (the individual with more C) has higher social status
than the transferee (the individual with less C). But the Pigou-Dalton
principle is not satisfied (1) in cases where the transferor has lower social
status than the transferee, nor (2) in cases where the two individuals have
the same social status.119 Why would these restrictions be justified?
A straightforward argument for status-based restriction (1) is that
having a higher status is itself a substantial boost to well-being. Thus, the
116.
Cf. Martin Ravallion, Measuring Social Welfare with and Without Poverty Lines, 84 AEA
PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 359, 360 (1994) (suggesting that empirical difficulties in measuring wellbeing and uncertainties about the parameters of a social welfare function help to justify poverty
metrics).
117.
See John Creedy, Labour Supply and Social Welfare when Utility Depends on a Threshold
Consumption Level, 73 ECON. RECORD 159 (1997); G.W. Lewis & D.T. Ulph, Poverty, Inequality and
Welfare, 98 ECON. J. 117 (1988).
118.
The desirability of social-gradient versus population-wide measures of health inequality is
one of the themes of an important recent book: INEQUALITIES IN HEALTH: CONCEPTS, MEASURES, AND
ETHICS (Nir Eyal, Samia A. Hurst, Ole F. Norheim & Dan Wikler eds., 2013). This Article was written
prior to the publication of the book, and the analysis of social-gradient metrics that follows has not been
refined to take account of it.
119.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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Generic Justification often does not apply where the transferee has higher
status, since her status advantage may compensate for her comparative
deficit in C and make her better off than the transferor, all-thingsconsidered. This argument, note, hinges on the absence of an inclusive
measure of well-being that itself incorporates status effects.120 Moreover,
the argument does nothing to explain status-based restriction (2).
A different kind of argument—one that helps to explain both statusbased restrictions—has to do with individual responsibility. Such an
argument can be drawn from the work of Iris Marion Young, a philosopher
who has provided one of the fullest defenses to date of the social-gradient
format for conceptualizing equity. Young argues:
[I]f we simply identify some inequality of condition or situation
between individuals at a particular time we have no account of the
causes of this unequal condition. It is the causes and consequences
of some pattern of inequality, rather than the pattern itself, that
raise issues of justice. If the causes of an inequality lie in the
uncoerced and considered decisions and preferences of the less
well-off persons, for example, then the inequality is probably not
unjust . . . .
. . . [However], the causes of many inequalities of resources or
opportunities among individuals lie in social institutions, their rules
and relations, and the decisions others make within them that affect
the lives of the individuals compared.121
Young concludes that an inequality must be a “structural inequality” to
be a central concern of distributive justice. “Structural
inequality . . . consists in the relative constraints some people encounter in
their freedom and material well-being as the cumulative effect of the
possibilities of their social positions, as compared with others who in their
social positions have more options or easier access to benefits.”122
Young’s suggestion dovetails with the “responsibility-sensitive” strain
of modern egalitarianism, pioneered by Ronald Dworkin and Richard
Arneson.123 Dworkin and Arneson’s insight was that equality of welfare

120.
Cf. Thomas Aronsson & Olof Johansson-Stenman, When the Joneses’ Consumption Hurts:
Optimal Public Good Provision and Nonlinear Income Taxation, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 986 (2008)
(discussing utility functions where an individual’s well-being depends upon her relative as well as
absolute income).
121.
Iris Marion Young, Equality of Whom? Social Groups and Judgments of Injustice, 9 J. POL.
PHIL. 1, 8. (2001).
122.
Id. at 15.
123.
Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77 (1989);
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981);
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981).
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could not be the criterion of distributive justice, since well-being
inequalities might be the result of poor individual choices, rather than bad
luck or unfair conditions.
Individuals can arrive at different welfare levels due to choices
they make for which they alone should be held responsible. A
simple example would be to imagine two persons of identical tastes
and abilities who are assigned equal resources by an agency
charged to maintain distributive equality. The two then voluntarily
engage in high-stakes gambling, from which one emerges
rich . . . and the other poor . . . . In . . . [another] example, one
person may voluntarily cultivate an expensive preference . . . ,
while another person does not. In . . . [these] examples it would be
inappropriate to insist upon equality of welfare when welfare
inequality arises through the voluntary choice of the person who
gets lesser welfare.124
Note that the Generic Justification is alive to the responsibilityegalitarian insight by including the transferee’s lack of responsibility for
being worse off as one condition for a justified transfer.
Now, Young’s insight is that inequality caused by poor social position
is sufficient to meet the responsibility-egalitarian test. If Leela has less
income, or life expectancy, or happiness, or health than Morris because of
the fact that Leela is lower status, that inequality is not Leela’s fault. This
insight is clearly correct, if social position itself largely flows from
immutable characteristics such as race or gender. But what of the case
where someone’s social position may be partly determined by her own
prior choices—for example, in societies where income substantially shapes
social position?
Even leaving aside the mutability of social position itself, Young’s
analysis can be criticized for conflating a sufficient condition for unjust
inequality with a necessary condition. Assume that Max, like Leela, is
worse off than Morris, but (unlike her) shares Morris’s social position. It
hardly follows from responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism that the
Max/Morris disparity is normatively neutral. Obviously, factors outside
Max’s control, other than his social position, might account for his being
worse off than Morris. He might have been mistreated by his parents,
victimized in a home invasion, hit by a negligent driver, systematically
harassed by malicious coworkers, etc.

Much of the subsequent philosophical literature on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism is cited in
Nicholas Barry, Reassessing Luck Egalitarianism, 70 J. POL. 136 (2008).
124.
Arneson, supra note 123, at 83–84.
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Still, the proponent of the social-gradient approach to measuring equity
might repackage Young’s analysis—seeing social position not as a strictly
necessary or sufficient condition for injustice but as a workable proxy for
responsibility. If Leela is worse off than Morris, and has a lower social
position than him, it is much more likely that she lacks responsibility for
this divergence than in the cases of Max and Neil, who are worse off than
Morris but—respectively—have equal or higher social position.
This observation, in turn, helps to rationalize both of the status-based
restrictions inherent in the social-gradient approach—status-based
restrictions (1) and (2), above—if finer-grained techniques for determining
Leela’s, Max’s, and Neil’s responsibility are not available. Let us now,
therefore, consider “equality of opportunity” metrics—a recent
development in scholarship on equity—which purport to offer a general
methodology for parsing between responsibility and non-responsibility
factors in the measurement of equity.
V. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY METRICS
Systematic work on adjusting equity metrics to take account of
individual responsibility begins, in the 1990s, with John Roemer’s
scholarship, itself inspired by the philosophical explorations, starting yet a
decade earlier, of responsibility-sensitive egalitarians such as Dworkin and
Arneson.125 Roemer proposes to separate between an individual’s
“circumstances” (the characteristics for which she lacks responsibility) and
her “effort” (the characteristics for which she bears responsibility).126 An
individual’s level of attainment, with respect to some currency (be it health,
income, utility, etc.), given some government policy, would be a function
both of her “circumstances” and of her “effort.”127
The population can, in principle, be separated into different
“circumstance” classes, defined by a particular cluster of “circumstance”
attributes. For example, if the individual’s race, urban or rural place of
birth, and parental education (defined, e.g., as whether both parents

125. For presentations and theoretical discussions of Roemer’s approach, see JOHN E. ROEMER,
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY (1998); John E. Roemer, On Several Approaches to Equality of
Opportunity, 28 ECON. & PHIL. 165 (2012); John E. Roemer, Defending Equality of Opportunity, 86
MONIST 261 (2003); John E. Roemer, Equality of Opportunity: A Progress Report, 19 SOC. CHOICE &
WELFARE 455 (2002); MARC FLEURBAEY, FAIRNESS, RESPONSIBILITY & WELFARE ch. 8 (2008);
Matthias Hild & Alex Voorhoeve, Equality of Opportunity and Opportunity Dominance, 20 ECON. &
PHIL. 117 (2004); Erwin Ooghe et al., Equality of Opportunity versus Equality of Opportunity Sets, 28
SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 209 (2007); Mathias Risse, What Equality of Opportunity Could Not Be, 112
ETHICS 720 (2002). Empirical applications are cited infra note 134.
126.
John E. Roemer, Equality of Opportunity: A Progress Report, 19 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE
455 (2002).
127.
Id.
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graduated high school) are each “circumstance” attributes, then white
individuals born in cities whose parents have both graduated high school is
one circumstance class, white individuals born in rural areas whose parents
have both graduated high school is another circumstance class, etc.
Similarly, the population can be divided into different “effort” classes.
“Effort” as well as “circumstance” may be difficult to observe—raising
econometric questions—but in principle each cluster of “effort” attributes
defines an “effort” class. For example, if the individual’s education level
(as contrasted with the level of education of her parents), and whether she
engages in regular exercise, are “effort” attributes, then high schooleducated individuals who engage in regular exercise would be one “effort”
class, high school-educated individuals who don’t regularly exercise a
second, etc.
A governmental policy, then, corresponds to a matrix.128 The rows of
the matrix are “circumstance” classes. The columns are “effort” classes.
The entry in each “cell” of the matrix is the attainment level, in the chosen
currency, of individuals in the corresponding effort class and circumstance
class. A policy will yield a particular such attainment level for each cell
(circumstance-effort pairing); there will also be a particular number of
individuals at each circumstance-effort pairing. For simplicity, my
presentation of the Roemer approach and variations will assume that the
number of such individuals is the same.129
How to rank matrices? Roemer proposes to do so in a manner that will
be sensitive to equity, but more specifically will see inequality of
attainment due to variation in circumstance—not inequality of attainment
due to variation in effort—as inequitable. Yet more specifically, Roemer
suggests the following responsibility-egalitarian rule for ranking matrices.
(1) For a given policy P, and a given effort class e, determine the lowest
level of attainment of any circumstance class making effort e. Call this
value min(P, e). (2) Assign P an overall value by summing the min(P, e)
values across all the effort classes. (3) Choose the policy with the greatest
such value.
An obvious objection to the Roemer approach is that it focuses solely
on the worst-off individual within each effort grouping. Assume that there
are three or more circumstance classes, and that policy Pʹ—within each
effort class—improves the attainment of the second-worst-off individual, at
the expense of the best-off individual. Then Pʹ is, plausibly, both (1) a more

128.
Or, more generally, to a probability distribution over such matrices—but issues of
uncertainty are ignored here. See supra note 77.
129.
See Ooghe et al., supra note 125, at 211, 214 (adopting this assumption for Roemer-leximin
and discussing how it might be relaxed).
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egalitarian policy than P, and (2) a better policy than P, all things
considered. But the Roemer rule will rank Pʹ and P equally good.
However, there is a rule closely related to the Roemer approach—call it
Roemer-leximin—which has the effect of preferring Pʹ to P. Roemerleximin compares two policies by summing the lowest attainments in each
effort class (if there are E effort classes, P is assigned the sum of the E
lowest-in-effort-class values resulting from P, and Pʹ the sum of the E
lowest-in-effort-class values resulting from Pʹ). If these sums are equal, the
policies are compared by summing the second-lowest attainment levels
within each effort class; if those are equal, by summing the third-lowest
attainment levels within each effort class; etc.130
How, exactly, does Roemer-leximin achieve the “trick” of seeing
inequality due to circumstance, but not effort, as inequitable? To see this,
intuitively, let us consider an especially simple case. Assume that policy P
is such that circumstance classes can be unambiguously ranked from worst
to best.131 Imagine, first, a policy Pʹ that erases all inequality within each
effort class. Pʹ is such that each effort class (each column of the matrix) has
exactly the same attainment level—namely, the average value of the
corresponding column in P. Imagine, now, a different policy P* which
erases all inequality within each circumstance class. Each such class (each
row of the matrix) has exactly the same attainment level—namely, the
average value of the corresponding row in P. Finally, P+ achieves full
equality: every cell of the matrix has the same value (namely, the average
value of all cells in P).
Note, now, that Roemer-leximin will see P* (merely erasing inequality
due to effort variation) as no improvement at all on P. By contrast, Pʹ
(erasing inequality due to circumstantial variation) is ranked as an
improvement. And P+ (complete equality) is no further improvement: P+
and Pʹ are ranked equally good by Roemer-leximin. See Table 5.

130.
See id.
131.
In other words, there are circumstance classes c1, c2, c3 . . . ; and, with policy P, the highest
effort in c1 yields a lower attainment than the lowest effort in c2, the highest effort in c2 yields a lower
attainment than the lowest effort in c3, etc. Again, this is an especially simple case; but it serves to
illustrate in a dramatic way how Roemer-leximin separates between inequality due to circumstance and
effort.
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Table 5: The
T Roemer--Leximin Ap
pproach to Eq
quity:

Mo
ore formally, and generaally, the wayy in which Roemer-lexim
min
bifurcattes between effort
e
and cirrcumstances ccan be expressed in termss of
our old friend: the Pigou-Dalton
P
principle. Fiirst, Roemer-lleximin fails the
ordinary
y Pigou-Dalton principle. If two indivviduals are inn different efffort
classes,, one reachin
ng a higher attainment
a
leevel than a second, a PiggouDalton transfer betw
ween them is
i not necesssarily preferrred by Roem
mer132
leximin
n.
Second, Roemer-leximin satisfiees a restricteed Pigou-Dallton
principlle—with the restriction,
r
no
ow, expressedd not in termss of poverty liines
or sociaal groups but in terms of efffort classes.
Pigou
u-Dalton Prin
nciple: Efforrt Class Restrricted
Asssume that po
olicy P produ
uces some diistribution off currency C
acro
oss the entiree population, and policy P
Pʹ produces ann alternative
disttribution, whiich representts a Pigou-Daalton transferr within one
effo
ort class e, between every
yone within tthat class at ssome higher
leveel of C, to ev
veryone at so
ome lower leevel. Then poolicy Pʹ is a
norrmative impro
ovement over P.133

132.
Assume for simp
plicity that there iss one individual w
within each circumsstance-effort groupping,
he transfer does not change either the
t transferee’s orr the transferor’s rrank within their eeffort
and that th
classes. Th
hen such a transfeer will be seen as an improvement ((yielding a higher--ranked matrix) byy the
Roemer-leeximin rule if the transferee’s rank within her effort class is lower thaan the transferor’s rank
within herr effort class; it wiill produce no chaange with respect tto that rule if the ranks are equal; aand it
will be seeen as a worsenin
ng (yielding a low
wer-ranked matrixx) by the Roemeer-leximin rule if the
transferee’’s rank within her effort class is high
her than the transfeeror’s rank within hers.
133.
The proviso that a Pigou-Dalton trransfer must occuur between everyonne at the two currrency
o maintain consisstency with the sim
mplifying assumpption that, in all p olicies, the number of
levels is to
individuals in each circumsstance-effort group
ping is the same. See supra note 1 29 and accompannying
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Since Roemer’s pioneering contributions, the literature on
responsibility-sensitive equity metrics has blossomed. Such metrics are
often, now, referred to as “equality-of-opportunity” metrics, although that
is something of a misnomer—since the unifying feature of these metrics is
not “opportunity” per se, but rather the “effort”/“circumstance”
bifurcation—the distinction between those sources of differential
attainment for which the affected individuals bear responsibility, versus
those for which they don’t. Work in this vein includes empirical
scholarship by Roemer and collaborators,134 as well as the development of
alternative approaches for constructing responsibility-sensitive metrics.135
Important alternatives to the Roemer methodology include these:
(1) Equalizing the “options” of each type. As in the Roemer approach,
each policy corresponds to a matrix, with circumstance groupings
corresponding to rows and effort classes to columns. We assign each row a
single “option” value, as a function of every cell in that row. (Most simply,
this value is just the average of the entries—meaning the attainment of an
individual in that circumstance grouping if she is equally likely to exert any
of the effort levels.) Then each policy corresponds to a list of “option”
values, one for each circumstance. And policies are then ranked by
applying an inequality metric or SWF to these lists.136
(2) Calculating what inequality of attainment would be, if efforts were
identical. For a given matrix of circumstances, efforts, and resulting
attainments, we can choose a particular effort class and predict what the
distribution of attainments would be if everyone’s effort attributes were in
that particular class, with their circumstances unchanged. And we can then
text. For purposes of real-world policy assessment, the Roemer-leximin rule would of course need to
relax that assumption, and (depending on how the rule is specified for the different-number case) the
proviso might be relaxed as well.
134.
See, e.g., Humberto G. Llavador & John E. Roemer, An Equal-Opportunity Approach to the
Allocation of International Aid, 64 J. DEV. ECON. 147 (2001); John E. Roemer et al., To What Extent
Do Fiscal Regimes Equalize Opportunities for Income Acquisition Among Citizens? 87 J. PUB. ECON.
539 (2003).
135.
Discussions of alternative approaches include: FLEURBAEY, supra note 125; Rolf Aaberge
et al., Measuring Long-Term Inequality of Opportunity, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 193 (2011); François
Bourguignon et al., Inequality of Opportunity in Brazil, 53 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 585 (2007);
Daniele Checchi & Vito Peragine, Inequality of Opportunity in Italy, 8 J. ECON. INEQUALITY 429
(2010); Hild & Voorhoeve, supra note 125; Francisco H.G. Ferreira and Vito Peragine, Individual
Responsibility, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY (Matthew D. Adler &
Marc Fleurbaey eds., forthcoming 2015); Arnaud Lefranc et al., Inequality of Opportunities vs.
Inequality of Outcomes: Are Western Societies All Alike?, 54 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 513 (2008);
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, On the Design of Equal-Opportunity Policies, 31 INVESTIGACIONES
ECONÓMICAS 351 (2007); Ooghe et al., supra note 125; Nicolas Pistolesi, Inequality of Opportunity in
the Land of Opportunities, 1968-2001, 7 J. ECON. INEQUALITY 411 (2009); Giuseppe Pignataro,
Equality of Opportunity: Policy and Measurement Paradigms, 26 J. ECON. SURVEYS 800 (2012)
(reviewing many empirical studies implementing Roemer’s approach or alternatives); Juan Gabriel
Rodriguez, Partial Equality-of-Opportunity Orderings, 31 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 435 (2008);
Roemer, On Several Approaches, supra note 125.
136.
See Ooghe et al., supra note 125.
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ascribe a degree of inequality to the matrix by applying an inequality
metric to this counterfactual distribution of attainments. (The
counterfactual distribution, of course, depends on which effort grouping
everyone is hypothesized as falling into.)137
(3) Calculating what inequality of attainment would be, if
circumstances were identical. Symmetrically, starting with a matrix of
circumstances, efforts, and resulting attainments, we can choose a
particular circumstance class and predict what the distribution of
attainments would be if everyone’s circumstances were in that class, with
their effort attributes unchanged. The resulting counterfactual distribution
is not unfair: it reflects just diversity in attainment due to diverse effort.
Thus, by applying an inequality metric to the original distribution of
attainments, and then subtracting the inequality number assigned to this
counterfactual distribution, we arrive at a responsibility-adjusted inequality
number for the original matrix.138
Such alternative methodologies, like the Roemer-leximin approach, fail
to satisfy the ordinary Pigou-Dalton principle: a transfer between
individuals in different effort classes will not, necessarily, decrease the
measured degree of inequity. However, like Roemer-leximin, they may
well satisfy some appropriately restricted principle (focused, in some way,
on transfers between individuals with different circumstances).
Responsibility-adjustment is an important development in scholarship
on equity measurement. First, it seeks concrete tools by which to express
the compelling, but quite abstract, normative insights of Dworkin, Arneson,
and other philosophers in their camp—tools more fine-grained than socialgradient metrics. Second, (like any substantially new equity-measurement
methodology) it may well offer a new “take” on any specific question of
equity. Consider, for example, the question mooted in the Introduction: has
the United States become a less equitable society over the last thirty-five
years? Pistolesi addressed this question using data from the Michigan
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which surveys a large group of U.S.
individuals annually—ascertaining both the respondent’s earned (labor)
income and certain other characteristics, in particular: the respondent’s age,
the educational level of his parents, his father’s occupation, the
respondent’s race, his region of birth, his own educational attainment, and
the number of hours worked annually.139 Pistolesi classified the last two
characteristics as “effort” attributes, and the others as “circumstance”
attributes. He then estimated responsibility-adjusted inequality of U.S.
income, on an annual basis, using the sample data and the two
137.
138.
139.

See Pistolesi, supra note 135, at 414–15.
See Bourguignon et al., supra note 135; Pistolesi, supra note 135, at 414–15.
See Pistolesi, supra note 135.
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“counterfactual” methodologies described in the previous paragraph.
Pistolesi concluded that, while inequality of income increased dramatically
between 1980 and 2000, responsibility-adjusted income inequality hardly
increased at all.140
To be sure, the day still seems far off when the responsibilityadjustment approach becomes the dominant method for quantifying
equity—displacing non-adjusted inequality metrics, poverty metrics, social
welfare functions, and social-gradient metrics. The approach (at least as
presently developed) has various limitations:
(1) Distinguishing between circumstances and efforts. The approach, at
its core, categorizes some attributes as efforts and others as circumstances.
Such differentiation will inevitably be controversial. (For example,
Pistolesi’s conclusion about the time trend of U.S. income inequality
hinges on the quite contestable view that an individual is responsible for his
education level and labor hours.) The responsibility-adjusted egalitarian
might counter that such controversies are a virtue of the approach—that the
approach brings to the surface normative questions that are both difficult,
but also vital, for any truly nuanced assessment of equity, and that are
ignored or “buried” by other methodologies. For example—she might
say—the social-gradient methodology implicitly counts social class as a
“circumstance” and all other attributes as an “effort.” Still, it is relevant to
note—as a predictive, not normative matter—that the responsibilitysensitive approach may fail to gain widespread traction just because any
specific result will be vulnerable to criticism by those who reject the
attendant effort/circumstance differentiation.
(2) The diversity of approaches. A diverse array of distinct techniques
exist for normalizing equity to “wash out” differential effort. I have
described four, and the literature has explored yet further methods.
Progress now needs to be made in clarifying the pros and cons of the
different formats, and (ultimately) achieving some consensus on their
relative preferability—akin to the convergence of the inequalitymeasurement literature on a relatively short list of standard metrics, or the
poverty-measurement literature on a preference for the FGT class.
(3) Effort as a residual. Some approaches (not all) effectively define
effort as a residual. For example, in much of his work, Roemer actually
“infers” an individual’s effort from her attainment—by observing her
percentile of attainment in the distribution of attainments for her
circumstance—rather than using some independent attributes (labor hours,

140.
A more recent empirical study of responsibility-adjusted inequality in the U.S. is Gustavo A.
Marrero & Juan G. Rodriguez, Inequality of Opportunity in the United States: Trends and
Decomposition, in INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 217 (Juan Gabriel
Rodriguez ed., 2011).

5 ADLER 551-607 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

606

1/28/2015 2:55 PM

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 66:3:551

educational attainment, etc.) as a direct marker of effort.141 But doing so
tends to overstate the role of differential effort in producing observed
inequality, and (conversely) to understate the degree of genuine inequity
associated with any given outcome or policy.142
CONCLUSION
This Article has surveyed a wide range of equity-sensitive metrics, and
has brought to light their shared nexus to the Pigou-Dalton principle. All
satisfy that principle in some form. Traditional income-inequality metrics
do so with respect to income: a pure, non-rank-switching transfer of
income, from someone with more income to someone with less, leaving
everyone else’s income unchanged, reduces the degree of income
inequality. Similarly, equity-regarding SWFs satisfy the Pigou-Dalton
principle with respect to “utility”; multidimensional inequality and poverty
metrics, with respect to a multiplicity of well-being relevant attributes;
poverty metrics, in a “restricted” fashion defined by a poverty line; socialgradient metrics, with a different sort of “restriction,” involving the relative
social positions of transferee and transferor; and responsibility-sensitive
approaches, with a normalization that takes account of individual
“effort.”143 Risk and time create further orthogonal possibilities.144
Differences in the specification of the Pigou-Dalton principle do not
account for all differences in equity metrics,145 but go a long way. The
Pigou-Dalton principle is truly the heart of equity, just as the Pareto
principle is the heart of efficiency. But Pigou-Dalton has more “open
texture” than the Pareto principle146—it seems to invite a wider range of
plausible specifications—and it is this multiplicity that largely accounts for
the diversity of equity metrics.
The Article has not only taxonomized equity metrics, using the PigouDalton principle as the key organizing principle, but I have also taken a
normative perspective—a welfarist one.147 Welfarism is not utilitarianism.
141.
See Hild & Vorhooeve, supra note 125, at 122–24; Ooghe et al., supra note 125, at 211;
Roemer, Defending Equality of Opportunity, supra note 125, at 267–69; Roemer, Equality of
Opportunity, supra note 125, at 461–63. See also Checchi & Peragine, supra note 135, at 432
(discussing how their framework defines effort as a residual).
142.
Indeed, Roemer concedes as much. See Roemer, Equality of Opportunity, supra note 125, at
463.
143.
See supra Part I.
144.
See supra note 77.
145.
See supra text accompanying note 77.
146.
As regards the open texture of the Pareto principle, see ADLER, supra note 28, at 52–53.
Note that the present Article employs economists’ specific version of the principle, as a principle
concerning preferences, and not the more general version which John Broome has termed the “principle
of personal good” and which Well-Being and Fair Distribution employs.
147.
See supra Part II.
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Welfarism and a concern for fair distribution can be—indeed, very
plausibly should be—combined.148
From this perspective, many of the current formats for measuring
equity are imperfect. A better approach, in principle, would be to employ
an equity-regarding SWF, suitably adjusted for responsibility.149 A welldesigned utility function would be sensitive to multiple sources of wellbeing (unlike income, which ignores non-market sources);150 would covary
with preferences (and thus avoid the conflicts with the Pareto principle that
afflict multidimensional metrics);151 would have a discontinuity around the
level of basic needs (obviating the need for poverty metrics);152 and would
use social status as one determinant of utility (obviating one argument for
social-gradient metrics). Systematic adjustment for differential effort would
obviate a second argument for social-gradient metrics.153
The key obstacles to this “first best” approach are twofold: (1)
overcoming the heterogeneity of preferences in designing an
interpersonally comparable measure of utility;154 and (2) arriving at a
consensus format for the “effort” adjustment,155 so that utility is
appropriately normalized to take account of individual responsibility.
Some progress has been made on these two fronts, but much more remains
to be done. Putting a number on injustice is not a quixotic or hopeless task,
but neither is it smooth sailing. Doing so means patiently refining tools and
methodologies to mirror underlying normative commitments—whether
those commitments center around human well-being or something else.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See generally ADLER, supra note 28; Arneson, supra, note 90.
See supra Part V; ADLER, supra note 28, at 579–84.
See supra text accompanying note 86.
See supra text accompanying note 94.
See supra text accompanying notes 114–117.
See supra Section IV.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 99–105.
See supra Part V.

